

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-17]

**GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS
AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012
BUDGET REQUEST**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
MARCH 10, 2011



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65-465

WASHINGTON : 2011

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**GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS AND THE FISCAL
YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 10, 2011.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:31 a.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. Now called to order. We want to welcome all of our witnesses and tell you how excited we are to hear your testimony today. I want to thank you for your service to our country and particularly for taking time to share your experiences and insight with us as we look at the readiness needs for our men and women in uniform.

We did something a little bit out of order today. This is one of the most bipartisan subcommittees, I think, that we have in Congress. And I am proud to serve with my ranking member from Guam, Madeleine Bordallo and she is not only our partner in this, but she is a great resource for us in the entire Pacific area having traveled there so much, lived there, studied there.

And we all believe that the Pacific is a huge area of concern for us and readiness concern, so I am going to turn now to Madeleine and ask her to offer her opening remarks and any comments that she might have.

Ms. Bordallo.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your kind remarks. And I do look forward to seeing how this new dialogue format works out during this morning's hearings.

To our witnesses, I look forward to your testimony.

General Carlisle, it is good to see you again. We miss you out at the 13th Air Force in Hawaii, but we are glad to have your background and expertise in the Pentagon.

To the other witnesses, it was nice to meet you all this past week and discuss issues of mutual concern.

Today's hearing is the second part in a series that is investigating the readiness of our military to respond, in the context of the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, to the full spectrum of threats that are known and threats that are unknown.

During the last hearing with the panel of outside witnesses, I stressed that assuming risk is expected in any budget, especially in our operation and maintenance budgets. And I think the key is to understand better where we assume risk and why this committee should accept that risk.

The QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] Global Posture Review and other strategic documents outline a broad and ambitious goal of addressing the full spectrum of threats. And I hope that our witnesses today can contextualize their remarks with these strategic documents as guides. In other words, explain the risk this budget request presents in the context of our Nation's strategic global defense posture.

And further, I remain concerned that, given the size and the scope of the operation and maintenance budget, these accounts are prime targets for budget cuts. Given the current era of fiscal austerity, I feel that these accounts will become even easier targets for cuts as the Department pursues a broad range of cost-cutting initiatives.

It may be easy to cut O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding now to make up shortfalls elsewhere, but the second- and the third-order effects of these cuts can end up costing the Department and our taxpayers more in the long run.

I also hope that our witnesses will address what impact a potential year-long continuing resolution will have not just on fiscal year 2011 but on the budget for 2012. I feel that if we do not pass a defense appropriations bill with the requested fiscal year 2011 funding levels, that we will end up with even further significant shortfalls in 2012 that will negatively affect readiness without truly addressing our country's core fiscal issues.

In particular, I am concerned about the operational impact of the canceled Navy ship maintenance availabilities. The key to a 313-ship Navy is ensuring that our ships are continually and well maintained to achieve their expected and even extended service life. How will the Navy address this matter?

Further and in a broader context, I am deeply concerned about training capabilities and overall readiness in the Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility]. I remain concerned that even while our Services move to expanded ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platforms, we still—we still—do not have sufficient coverage in the Pacific.

While I greatly appreciate the Administration's tremendous focus on the Asia-Pacific region, I believe that more can be done to better posture us against current and emerging threats in this region. We focus on China's growing military power and North Korea's nuclear capability, but we cannot lose sight of asymmetric threats in Indonesia, southern Philippines and southern Thailand.

So I hope our witnesses can also discuss the importance of the military buildup on Guam and the strategic importance of this realignment of military forces to meet both traditional and asymmetric threats in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back my time.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.

And once again, I want to welcome all our members today to what I think is going to prove to be one of the most important hearings of the year. We have the opportunity to discuss not only the state of military readiness today, but to also look to the future readiness needs of the force.

Joining us today are four exceptional witnesses representing each of our military services. They are Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General "Hawk" Carlisle, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy for the United States Navy; and Lieutenant General Richard T. Tryon, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps.

These four distinguished gentlemen are often referred to as the Ops [operations] deputies or Ops Deps inside the Pentagon. They are charged with not only formulating policy to advance their Services' core missions, but they are also responsible for determining the operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to support the national security objectives and military strategy.

Gentlemen, we are truly honored to have you join us today, and we are extremely grateful for all you do to keep this Nation safe. Thank you for your service.

This hearing is the second in a series of hearings we are holding to ask the question, "Are we ready?" Last week's testimony by a panel of independent witnesses was extremely thought-provoking, and I believe it serves as a great framework for our discussion today.

The witnesses all emphasized that our force levels are inappropriately sized and apportioned to respond to challenges of current global environment. Ms. Eaglen also illuminated the fact that our Nation's armed forces are approaching a geriatric state.

To give our members a few specific examples of what that really means, our surface fleet has an average age of 19 years. The average age of our strategic bombers is 34 years. The average age of the C-130H fleet, which I know many members are familiar with because we often fly on them when we go on CODELs [Congressional Delegations], is 23 years. Our Air Force tanker fleet is over 46 years, and the Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicle fleet has an average age of 38 years.

Not only have we allowed our ships and aircraft to reach this geriatric state, but we have also downsized our inventory. In 1990, we had the equivalent of 76 Army brigades. Today, that number is 45. In 1990, we had 546 Navy ships. Today we have 286. In 1990, we had 82 Air Force fighter squadrons. Today we have the equivalent of 39. In 1990, we had 360 strategic bombers. Today we have 162, and the Air Force wants to retire six of these before the next one is even funded.

We find ourselves postured in this manner at a time when China has rapidly grown and modernized its military. I ask unanimous consent that this chart depicting the growth in China's surface fleet, submarine force, air force and air defense between 2000 and

2009 be entered into the record. The chart is up on the screen, and each of our members will be given a copy of it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. FORBES. We cannot afford to allow a budget target to be the sole governing basis in our decisions today, or we will bear an enormous cost in the future. I like to refer to this as the instant pudding mindset. We have grown accustomed to quick solutions and fast results. However, the outcomes, in many cases, have been devastating.

There will be no instant pudding solutions to these challenges we face. We must break our dependence on deficit spending, right our entitlement programs, unleash our labor force, and reorder our Federal Government, if we are going to successfully respond to China's economic momentum and military buildup.

Once again, I am very thankful to our distinguished witnesses, and I look forward to our discussion.

And as a logistical matter, as the ranking member and I discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion.

I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum that will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. We would like to proceed with standard order for members to address the witnesses. However, if any member has a question pertinent to the matter being discussed at that time, please seek acknowledgment and wait to be recognized by the chair.

We plan to keep questioning to the standard 5 minutes. However, I don't want to curtail productive dialogue. I believe we can do this and still ensure each member has the opportunity to get his or her questions answered. If we get bogged down, the chair will ask members to hold further discussion until the first round of questioning is complete.

I ask unanimous consent that for the purposes of this hearing we dispense with the 5-minute rule and proceed as described. Since there is no objection, we will do that.

Let me do now two things logistically to our members. One of the things we are trying to do is just get answers. As I mentioned at the outset, we are blessed. This is one of the most bipartisan committees probably in Congress. And we had some suggestions at the last hearing that rather than wait until your 5-minute time comes along, if a member has a question or follow-up, we want you to ask that question when it comes along.

So what we are going to do is go in the order that the members are in terms of seniority. But if you have a question at any time based on that question or anything else, please just let me know. We are going try to be as flexible as we can in trying to get those answers. And if it runs too long, I will just try and stop that, and we will go into a second round.

Gentlemen, as I mentioned at the beginning, we thank you so much for your service. And I want to just kind of frame the opening of this something different than what we normally do. We have your written testimony, and I have read it. Many of our members have read it; if not, they will read it.

This morning what I am going to ask you to do is something different. Normally, we will have witnesses that come in, they give us written testimony, and then they give us 5 minutes of prepared remarks. The hope sometimes for our witnesses, I think, is to get out without having had to say anything. And we are caught in this dilemma.

Some of us are frustrated because Congress has been spending way too much money for years in the past, and we know that exists. There are some frustrations with some of our members because we don't feel—with some of the folks in the Pentagon, I am not talking about you but just some of them—we don't always get the answers we need on the analysis that we need.

Sometimes people walk over here, and they tell us, "the DOD [Department of Defense] has decided to make cuts, but you don't need to have any analysis on that at all. You just need to trust us." But then when we make cuts, they come over and say, "That is going to be the sky falling, and you just need to trust us."

Oftentimes, you have all heard this. In the field, you have heard the men and women that serve under you say, "Those guys in Washington just don't get it." This is your one opportunity to help us get it. And so for each of you, I would like for you to take about 5 minutes each before we go in to the question and tell us your perception of what those men and women under your commands need to be ready.

Are these budgets going to do it? What are your concerns about our readiness? This is your opportunity to make sure when a fight comes, we have done everything in our power to make sure we have prepared them. And we thank you for doing that.

And in alphabetical order, we are going to start, General Bolger, with you if you would. And thank you again for being here.

STATEMENT OF LTG DANIEL P. BOLGER, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (G3/5/7), U.S. ARMY

General BOLGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member Bordallo and all the distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee.

On behalf of Secretary McHugh, and General Casey, and more than 1 million soldiers who are serving today in the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, thanks for giving me this opportunity to talk about just what you just ask about, and that is the state of our Army readiness.

And thanks also for all of the members and your continued support and commitment to our soldiers and our operations worldwide.

You know, we live in a dangerous world, and I know that is not news to anybody here, but it bears repeating under these circumstances. We are a people that has global, political, economic, and security interests, and we do face threats that include terrorists, aggressive states and movements, and even nuclear-armed countries that have powerful conventional armed forces.

And one thing we have learned—I think it has been underscored for us in the last few weeks—we can rarely predict the next crisis. When things go wrong, we do have to be ready to fight. We do like to get ahead of the threats when we can, to deter and shape them in a constructive way.

We are always ready to engage positively to help our friends and partners. You know, right now, today soldiers are working in more than a 100 countries to train local forces and keep the peace and assist in humanitarian challenges. And soldiers bring a big range of skills. Some of those skills are unique even among the many skills provided by U.S. Government agencies.

And because soldiers can secure themselves when they go in to a foreign country, we can often go in to the toughest areas and still make a difference. Whether in combat campaigns, or in these shaping operations, successful efforts take time. And America's enemies always question our staying power. So to achieve lasting results our Army must sustain its operations over the long haul.

We have built on the experience of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, as well as our allies and have reshaped our force on a cycle of readiness for Army forces that runs year after year. We go out and we come back as trained, formed, and well-equipped units, and our combat effectiveness, I think, has been impressive.

We do have a strong Army today, Active, National Guard and Reserve. And we are fighting two major land campaigns as we gather this morning. We are also carrying our other key shaping tasks all around the world. We put about 200,000 soldiers out, about 170,000 rotational forces, and about 30,000 forward-deployed in friendly countries.

About 50,000 to 70,000 of these soldiers on a daily basis come from the National Guard and Reserve. Today, most of that combat power, as we know, is in Afghanistan and Iraq, and as we draw down in Iraq, we will let our forces come back from a surge level pace to one we can follow for a long time and keep going.

We would like to get to about 1 year out and 2 years back for Active forces, and about 1 year out and 4 years back for the Guard and Reserve, heading to a sustained rate of 1-to-3 and 1-to-5. And that tempo will let us reset and modernize our combat vehicles and our aircraft and our radios and our weapons and all our equipment.

And it will also allow to educate our leaders and our soldiers and to train our units across the full spectrum of operations from peace-keeping and wide area security up to and including combined arms maneuver.

And most important, a sustainable tempo will reinvigorate the strength of our force, our great volunteer soldiers. We spin too fast. We have some hard results, and we know those. We have got about 30,000 soldiers in long-term medical care, about 40,000 with post-traumatic stress. We have had challenges with our suicide rate, misdemeanor crimes, spouse and child abuse, all that.

There also has been a significant monetary cost of billions of dollars, not just in the Army and the Armed Forces, but across society. These are tragic long-term effects. And I think we have to think that just as we need to reset our jet bombers and our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with timeout for maintenance, we also have to take time to reset and recalibrate our most important strength of our Army, our soldiers.

So that is what our Army is doing today. It is an Army America can be proud of. And we will succeed today and in the future with your continued help. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Bolger can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

Mr. FORBES. General Carlisle.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HERBERT J. CARLISLE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS (A3/5), U.S. AIR FORCE

General CARLISLE. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the committee, again, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the readiness of your United States Air Force.

Before we start, though, I would like to wish Congressman Giffords a speedy recovery. And I look forward to her coming back to this committee as soon as possible and for her to know that all the members in the United States Military value her and respect her for everything she does for us, and certainly the men and women serving at Davis-Monthan in the Tucson area look for her speedy recovery.

My intent today is to describe the current status, activities and readiness of the United States Air Force. And I am proud to be here with my joint partners as well, because together we spend a lot of time just like this in different forums.

Let me begin by saying that the 690,000 men and women in the United States Air Force, Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and Department of Defense civilians who are ready to execute our mission. We are committed to the readiness and the ongoing operations abroad and at home.

Mr. Chairman, as you know—excuse me—since the events of 9/11, the tempo of our operations has continued to increase, with 2010 serving as a benchmark in just everything we have done. Close air support has increased. Our air refueling and airlift within the AOR has increased. Our ISR shortage has continued to double.

And we are asking more and more of these young men and women every day. I think to your point, Mr. Chairman, as all the members of Congress' job is to take care of their constituents, the gentlemen sitting at this table, our job is to take care of those men and women in harm's way outside the Beltway. And that is what we are going to do.

As a matter of fact, you can—one example would be our rescue forces. The heroic actions of our rescue forces have been hailed by the British, our partners over there as well as our U.S. partners, and as a matter of fact, the British combat soldiers can call our "Pedro" guys. That is the call sign of our rescue forces, the helicopters, and the airmen. It is the only thing more popular than mail in the AOR.

It says a lot about what they do. And when you say, "Pedro," we will come anywhere, anytime, during any weather. And the helicopters have the holes in them to prove it. At the same time we are trying to recapitalize that fleet and the CSR [Combat Search and Rescue] fleet and how we get back on step in giving them the equipment they need.

After 20 years of continuous deployments and 10 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these operations continue to stress both people and platforms, and they challenge our ability to main-

tain readiness to the full spectrum of operations. And, Mr. Chairman, that is the key. It is the full spectrum of operations, as Ms. Bordallo mentioned, these other things going on in the world and we are incredibly engaged to win the day's fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. But there are things throughout this world we have to be ready for, and that full spectrum of operations for all the Services is ones that we have to be cognizant of all the time.

And again, I know, Mr. Chairman, that everyone in this committee clearly knows that, given the increase in our operations and the decision to extend the continuing resolution, we all know that that will cause major perturbations and problems for our readiness.

It will suspend some systems sustainment. Depot maintenance activities will be deferred. Aircraft and airplanes going to depot will be deferred, all of which will adversely affect our people that are moving into harm's way every day, so we truly hope that Congress can come to a resolution of the DOD budget for fiscal year 2011 for the benefit of our military members.

They remain dedicated, and they are the foundation of our Air Force. And as you said, Mr. Chairman, it is all about the people and what they do for us day in and day out, out there. Across the spectrum of what we do, we are meeting and exceeding the combatant commanders' requirements today.

All of our capabilities are adequate to meet today's demands. And my concern for the future is how do we prepare for the next conflict in the next generation and what we are going to face next. Our aircraft readiness is adequate. It is not great. And it is not going up. It is level to going down, but—

I assume that is not me.

Mr. FORBES. It is our buzzer, General.

General CARLISLE. It is maintaining the level. It is adequate, but it is troubling for the future and again, our ability to conduct full spectrum operations.

Our mobility forces have doubled their activity almost every year. We are airdropping more in the AOR more than we ever have before. I will tell you that with respect to modernization and the slides you brought up, we have challenges, and we have to face those soon with respect to both modernization and recapitalization of all our fleets.

We are on a path with the F-35 and its way forward. The KC-46X, the C130-J, and CV-22 are all good starts, but we got a lot of work to do. And our combat forces continue to provide the needs of our United States, and of course, of our combatant commanders.

A strong Air Force will continue to deliver global vigilance, reach and power. The resolution, as I said before, the defense appropriations bill will certainly help continue our readiness in the Air Force and the ability to serve this Nation's daunting challenges in the future.

I have provided a written statement for the record. But I would like to thank you again for your interest in taking care of your airmen and on behalf of all the airmen and their families, thank for what you do for us.

[The prepared statement of General Carlisle can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mr. FORBES. And thank you, General. I apologize for the buzzing.

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. But the Air Force always comes through.
Admiral.

**STATEMENT OF VADM BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY (N3/
N5), U.S. NAVY**

Admiral CLINGAN. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the committee, I am in fact delighted and privileged to be here today.

Today, as we have done for more than 235 years, the Navy is forward-deployed around the world, protecting our national interests. Global trends and an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower.

Mr. Chairman, you asked what might be the preeminent concerns of the sailors, both here and abroad, and I would say that Congress writ large like this committee clearly does appreciate that.

As a maritime Nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both economic prosperity and national security. This places global demands on our naval forces. Their expeditionary capabilities enable and support joint force efforts to combat both conventional and irregular challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, throughout Africa, and elsewhere throughout the world.

As has been mentioned, while ground forces remain engaged in our OCO [overseas contingency operations] and eventually reconstitute and reset, naval forces will remain the Nation's strategic reserve and immediate response force.

The sustained presence and engagement of forward-stationed and rotational naval forces will take on even greater importance as the future security environment promises to be characterized by multiple, concurrent, diverse challenges that demand an immediate response that often can't wait for diplomatic access to be negotiated.

The President's budget in 2012 continues to maintain a Navy that is forward-postured and present to prevent conflict, deter aggression, enhance cooperative relationships, build the maritime security capacity of partners, provide humanitarian assistance, and prevail in combat at and from the sea, if required.

Thank you for your unwavering commitment to our sailors, our Navy civilians, and their families and for all you do to make the United States Navy an effective and enduring global force for peace.

I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan can be found in the Appendix on page 74.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.
General.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RICHARD T. TRYON, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS,
U.S. MARINE CORPS**

General TRYON. Good morning, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and the distinguished members of the committee here today.

Today, after nearly a decade of combat operations, the United States Marine Corps remains the country's expeditionary force in readiness. The ability of the Marine Corps to serve as the Nation's crisis response force can be attributed to the steadfast support of this committee and Congress, and for that, sir, we thank you.

The Commandant has established four service-level priorities as he has entered office—first, to provide the best-trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; second, rebalance our corps and posture it for the future; third, to better educate and train our marines to succeed in what is an increasingly complex operational environment; and fourth, to keep faith with our marines, our sailors, and their families.

At this moment there are roughly 32,000 marines deployed around the world. Twenty thousand are serving in Afghanistan's Helmand province. Partnering with the United States Navy, we are forward-deployed and forward-engaged across the globe. Deployed and deploying units report the highest levels of readiness for their assigned missions.

The distributed nature of the battlefield in Afghanistan, however, requires that we augment our forward-deployed forces with additional equipment and personnel from non-deployed forces and strategic programs. We can sustain this commitment under current conditions for as long as the Nation requires, acknowledging that it comes at a cost.

Our equipment abroad and at home station has been heavily taxed after nearly 10 years of combat operations. Sixty-seven percent of non-deployed units report degraded readiness in the areas of capabilities and/or resources. Resource shortfalls often manifest themselves as capability gaps in individual units or collective core competencies.

The primary factor underlying this is equipment, and approximately 63 percent of non-deployed forces report that mission-essential equipment shortfalls exist within their units. Home station equipment does not qualify for OCO funding in general. Units in dwell are also heavily leveraged in terms of leadership and occupational expertise.

Now, this is necessary in order to sustain our ongoing operational commitments of the deployed force. And for this reason, approximately 35 percent of non-deployed units report key personnel shortfalls. Operations have placed an unprecedented demand on ground weapon systems, vehicles, aviation assets, and support equipment.

Congress' continuing support is needed to posture the Marine Corps for the future, and this will require a multiyear effort well beyond the end of operations in Afghanistan and the drawdown thereafter. Our Commandant has directed that post OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom], we will reconstitute as a middleweight force capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict.

And what this means is that we will be capable of operating in the realm of theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief crisis response, as well as conventional high-intensity combat, and amphibious forcible entry. We are currently in the midst of a comprehensive planning effort to fulfill the Commandant's vision.

Building upon our strong traditional foundation and incorporating lessons learned from this conflict, we are confident the future Marine Corps will remain a capabilities-based organization, agile, flexible, and versatile. As marines continue to serve in combat, the Marine Corps remain the Nation's crisis response force, ready to respond to today's crisis with today's forces, today.

The Marine Corps needs the sustained support of the American people and Congress to maintain that readiness.

In order to meet the challenges of the future in the future security environment, we will require significant consideration with respect to reset and reconstitution. The Marine Corps is grateful for the support that Congress has provided to date. We are also mindful of the fiscal realities confronting our Nation.

We are committed to being responsible stewards of the scarce public funds that are available, and we are dedicated to serve the Nation with honor, courage, and commitment as America's expeditionary force in readiness.

So thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to the discussion and to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Tryon can be found in the Appendix on page 78.]

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you.

And thank all of our witnesses.

At this point in time we are going into our questioning. And one of the things that I am going to do is to defer my questions to the end, because I want to hear our members' questions, and I may intersperse some of mine throughout, but I would like to, at this particular point in time recognize the ranking member, the gentlelady from Guam, for any questions she might have.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be very quick.

I have an immediate concern relative to the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, and I would like to hear from all of the witnesses in just a very brief answer what impact a continuing resolution would have on operational matters in fiscal year 2011, as well as in fiscal year 2012.

We have already seen cancellations of ship availabilities in the Navy, so this situation is deeply concerning to me. So if you could just briefly answer that, beginning with General Bolger.

General BOLGER. Thank you, ma'am.

For us in the Army the continuing resolution challenge really comes down to operations and maintenance writ large. And that is we are going to do those things necessary to maintain our forces that are going into the fight. The challenges will begin to defer maintenance and training to give us capability for the full spectrum.

So based on a year-long continuing resolution, our effect, we would lose about \$3 billion in operations and maintenance budget,

and we have to focus our remaining resources clearly on the next to deploy. That would mean some of the full-spectrum training we have scheduled this year to regain our capability—for example, to do airborne assaults with elements of the 82nd Airborne, to do tank-on-tank combat with our armored forces, to do middleweight combat, as Rick Tryon referred to, that the Marines are doing that—some of that will be deferred, because we are going to put our money towards the next-to-deploy units.

There will be some significant impacts, I believe, on housing and installations, because military construction, obviously, is awaiting this, and so the new starts will not occur.

In addition, as I think you are aware, the Department of the Army has just recently extended their 30-day hiring freeze on civil servants another 30 days, so as that continues, that means that some soldiers will probably have to be diverted to do tasks that civil servants might be doing now, take us back to maybe 15 years ago where soldiers were doing things like checking vehicle registrations at gates and mowing the lawn and all that kind of stuff, which again diverts from the training and readiness that our force would need.

And finally, ma'am, I think the other thing that I would mention is the challenge it will cause in terms of modernization, because obviously with the continuing resolution we are going to maintain what we have, but we are not going to procure new weapons, some of which were in the middle of procurement phase, and some like our ground combat vehicles are just to start some major phases in their development. So all of that would be on hold as we go through the continuing resolution.

I guess I would summarize by saying that it will create a deferred maintenance in this year, and that bill will have to be paid at the same time we are trying to fight a war in Afghanistan and close out combat major operations in Iraq, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

General Carlisle.

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma'am, thank you.

Very similar, I think probably all four of us will have much the same comments. The O&M budget will be significantly affected. The flying-out programs and depot maintenance and depot level repairables will all be deferred. Today we are cash flowing to maintaining the capability to serve the fight, but that is going to run out. And at that point we are going to have to start doing other pretty draconian things to just support the fight with no training back home.

So on the O&M budget, as we move money within the O&M budget to cash flow what we are doing now, if it is not fixed in the fairly near term, then it is going to cause some pretty significant problems as we move forward.

Also MILCON [military construction] is another one—new mission MILCON as well as existing mission MILCON. We have projects out there and capabilities that we are going to bring to the fight fairly soon that we can't with no MILCON budget.

And also on the procurement side, we were going to ramp up, for example, our MQ-9 purchase to provide more ISR to the fight. And we can't increase that buy until we get a budget, so we are stuck

at a lower capability. And although it is procurement, it is near-term procurement that we can't do.

Also new starts, some of the capabilities that we are putting on those platforms, whether it is an ISR platform and kinetic or non-kinetic manner or some system or weapon that is a fairly short procurement timeline that we can get out in the field but we have to defer, and all this time it is causing us.

And then the third one again, as Dan said, is the milpers [military personnel] and civpers [civilian personnel] shortfalls are ones that are going—the hiring is an issue, as well as the fact that we know we have a milpers and civpers shortfall that we are going to have to figure out where that money is going to come from to pay for that. And again, we are going to have probably folks in uniform doing things that were done by civilians that we can't do, so.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General.

Admiral.

Admiral CLINGAN. Ma'am, the continuing resolution is having an effect both on current readiness and future readiness. Like all the Services, we will guarantee that the forces going forward into conflict and to do the forward-deployed missions are ready.

So as we find ourselves in a situation where we need to reduce both flying hours and steaming days, those shortfalls will be allocated against the forces that we are maintaining in their sustainment phase, which are our surge forces to respond to crises that may emerge and in those forces that are preparing to deploy. So we will see a decline in readiness to complete the mission set.

Quite specifically, if the continuing resolution were to continue through the balance of the year, we would find ourselves canceling 29 of 89—85, excuse me—maintenance availabilities for ships. Seventy aircraft requiring depot maintenance wouldn't get it; 290 engines wouldn't get their overhauls; 140 maintenance and construction projects across about 74 bases wouldn't be completed.

And then you look to the procurement side, the future readiness side, we would find ourselves not being able to procure two DDG-51s, which are BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] and multipurpose combatants. *Virginia*-class submarine wouldn't be procured. Two reactor cores, one for an SSBN and one for a carrier wouldn't be procured.

Well, thousands of orders for individual sailors wouldn't be processed, so they would miss some of their important career milestones. And lastly, our travel is curtailed as we endeavor to go build relationships with partners and enhance their abilities to carry their own security burdens. That is being reduced as well.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

General.

General TRYON. Yes, ma'am. Many of the same issues raised by my colleagues here apply. Equipment reset and future reconstitution is, of course, the greatest concern that we all have. We also will experience some concerns with civpers funding levels.

The continuing resolution affects us in the current year, and it will have a ripple effect in the out-years.

Immediately, MILCON comes to mind. \$567 million in contracts have not been awarded to date. \$2.4 billion is at risk for the remainder of the year. Contained in that is 13 BEQs, bachelor en-

listed quarters that are necessary to get our marines and serving sailors out of Cold War Era barracks that are 40 to 50 years old and put them into facilities that are appropriate for them.

\$71 million has not been awarded for our high-mobility artillery rocket system. There is \$168 million in the budget, but that significantly hampers our ability to procure and build toward the future, and it also violates some of the economy of scales that we would typically enjoy as we make these purchases.

Equipment reset as discussed is delayed, and there also we lose our economy of scales in making purchases that we can with the United States Army and the other Services.

Flight hours projected to shortfall is about \$225 million in our flight hour program at the rate that we are currently progressing, and we are flying at normal rates right now. Our sortie-based training plan will be suspended sometime during the fourth quarter of this fiscal year.

Marine air ground and control system contracts have not been awarded. Tactical communication, modernization contracts to the tune of \$61 million have not been awarded, and the list goes on. It is significant today in the here and the now, and it won't get any better, because the cost of recovery we would anticipate will only increase.

Thank you.

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me to ask that question, and as you can see all branches of the military agree on this. I know that Congress is looking for ways to address our financial situation, but a continuing resolution for the Department of Defense will only cost us more money and will certainly be very serious to our security in the future.

So I thank all of the witnesses and if any of the others would like to—

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo, and I think all of us concur. We just wish that the last Congress could have gotten their budget out so you guys weren't having this hanging over your head. But, unfortunately, that didn't happen, so we have to try to look and see how we can put Humpty Dumpty back together again. And that is going mean as the CR [continuing resolution] goes through also looking at your fiscal year 2012 figures, because we know they are all based on the fact that you had the fiscal year 2011 figures as well.

Our next question will be done by Dr. Heck.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thanks to all of the members here today for your dedication to our men and women in uniform and for your careers of selfless sacrifice to our Nation.

My question is for General Bolger. I appreciated the line in your written testimony regarding the Reserve Force as being a well-equipped, highly-trained and battle-wise operational force. The Reserve Force is the area that is near and dear to my heart.

And my question is regarding the ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model and trying to get to the, you know, one-to-two Active Duty and one-to-five Reserve dwell time. And I am speaking as a commander who has got units either deployed, getting ready to deploy, or just coming back from deployment. It seems that in the

ARFORGEN model there is a disconnect between TDA [Table of Distribution and Allowance] forces and TO&E [Table of Organization and Equipment] forces.

I live on the TO&E side—I am sorry, on the TDA side. And so, as we are cannibalized to back-fill units that are otherwise deploying, we wind up falling out of our ARFORGEN cycle. For instance, I have got a unit that is in year TR-2 that is currently deployed. What, if any, efforts are under way to try to come up with a force sustainment model that takes in the unique needs of the TDA side of the Reserve house?

General BOLGER. Sir, a great question. And the situation you described my colleague Rick Tryon talked about the same challenge that is occurring in the Marine Corps in particular, but in other Services.

What we are doing in the Army now, sir, is we have looked at not just our operations force, where we put our first emphasis, naturally, to get forces in the field to fight. Now we are also looking at the institutional side of the Army, what we call the generating force, the part of the Army that gets the other part ready. And we are trying to apply some of the same methods to them to get them on to our cyclical readiness just as you described, so we don't have to borrow from those units to fill up the next deployers.

And I will tell you, sir, the two things that are going to help with that, I believe, are, one, sort of systematizing our access to the Reserve Components, because the Guard and the Reserve are integral to what we do. As we gather this morning, there are almost 70,000 guardsmen and reservists on duty today with the U.S. Army.

We could not carry out our task around the world without this unprecedented amount of support from our citizen soldiers, so we got to think of ways to make sure that that great veteran force is looked after and fully integrated in everything we do.

And along those lines, sir, as you may be aware, Secretary McHugh asked General Reimer, the retired Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer. He and Lieutenant General Helmly and Lieutenant General Schultz, senior leaders of our Guard and Reserve, came together, ran a panel, and looked at how do we operationalize the Guard and Reserve. And not surprisingly, they brought back the exact kind of cases as you just described and said we have to do the institutional and the policy work that will solve that.

And some of that may require—after we get done looking at it, we may want to come back to the Congress for potential legislative assistance, if it is some authorities or something that we need to look at to better integrate our Guard and Reserve and the force, sir.

So a long answer, but a really critical subject for our force today, sir.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Heck, and that was an excellent question.

General, could I just follow up with one of the things that Dr. Heck raised? In your testimony you also mentioned the Army is in-

stitutionalizing or trying a rotational scheme, and you go on to mention the need to deliver a predictable supply of military power.

One of the questions we always ask ourselves are, is the Army ready, based on the current readiness state that we have and how stretched out you are, to deal with unpredictable events around the world, because one thing we know is that we are not good at predicting where they are going to be.

General BOLGER. Sir, exactly right. As we gather this morning, the Army does have the capability in the global response force that if I would have met you a few years back, I wouldn't have been able to say that.

We have an airborne brigade command team in readiness at Fort Bragg, if they are needed for anything around the world. Our intent is to expand that surge force or that emergency force so that eventually it will grow to a size of one division headquarters or—I am sorry—one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, 10 brigade combat teams and about 41,000 enabling forces of troops.

We are not there yet, and that is really contingent on our draw-down in Iraq proceeding on schedule and no increase in our commitments worldwide. But if those things go into effect, we believe in our planning that soldiers who deploy after the first of October in the Active Component can expect a year out and then 2 years back, and then the Reserve Component can expect a year out mobilized and then 4 years back. And that will allow us to reconstitute that surge force or that emergency force for just the kind of contingencies you are describing, sir.

We are not there yet but we can see it, and the only warning I would say is that it is always dependent on world conditions, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

Mr. Gibson from New York had a quick follow-up question on that.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the distinguished panelists, both for being here, your testimony and for your leadership of our service men and women and their families.

I did want to follow up on General Bolger's comments there. Based on my experience, recent experience, I led that global response force Army element to Haiti, and as a quick prefacing remark, let me just say that I have full faith that all the Services are dealing with the significant challenges of reset.

And I know that there are hard choices, prioritization, and that we are trying to recapitalize our fleet. We are trying to restore the balance to the force and all the emotional and mental challenges that go with resetting the soldier, sailor, airman, marine as well.

But my concern about readiness has more to do with how you all interrelate. You know, when I led that unit to Haiti, the challenges we had had to do with lift, having the capability to get our forces there to meet that mission, and then to have the enablers to come in a synchronized manner.

All Services came to the fore to respond to the President's request, but there were issues with how we synchronize the assets and certainly how we got the assets to get there. So my question

really is how often—you alluded to you get together often—how often do you speak about this, about—

When you talk about readiness—I am not talking about all that hard work you do to get your own Services ready—how much discussion is there about con ops [concept of operations], about how you put together the suite of forces so that we can respond in a joint manner, which we know is the way we are going to respond. And how much did we learn from the Haitian experience?

General BOLGER. Well, sir, I will start off and then defer to my colleagues, but I would mention that jointness is very critical to everything we do. We couldn't function without it. Soldiers, in particular, I mean, we need a ride everywhere we are going, and thank God we got the Air Force, the Navy to give us that ride.

You mentioned the Haiti experience, a short notice deployment with a force. You know, your force was ready to go, but a great hazard and great challenge to get them ready. And the other Services are just as stressed by worldwide operations, as you heard my colleagues say.

I think this is why it is really, really important that we continue our pace of modernization and continue to get all the Services on a sustainable rate of operations in dwell, because that is what gives you the time to do the joint training and education you need to gain those capabilities.

For us as the operations deputies, this is one of the things we have looked at. And, of course, as you know, one of the things we are looking at right now is how to keep the hard-won gains of jointness since the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986, how to keep them going with the lessons learned from the current conflict and what we foresee as our challenges in the future.

And that is something we do discuss quite a bit. It is often a subject of operations deputies meetings. And we definitely do bring in folks on things like Haiti and say, "What did we learn from that? You know, what went right? What went wrong? What can we do to mitigate these gaps," sir.

Mr. FORBES. And now we are going to go to Mr. Kissell, from North Carolina.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And kind of follow-up to the questions and comments just made, maybe a little bit of a plug to my colleagues. The Army is working on a CODEL for a 1-day trip to Fort Bragg, I think, in June, I believe, Chris, in June, that will feature a lot of this global response capability. We refer to Fort Bragg as being the center of the universe.

And Special Ops is there, Special Forces are there. Ten percent of all the Army will soon be based there with several commands and 34 flag officers there, so the most flag officers outside of the Pentagon, which I think a lot of our members might be able to learn a lot about this readiness component that we have in the global context. And as we get more information, we will pass that around.

But honestly, my question—and I will preface real quickly, the most important assignment that we have is where our men and women are in harm's way. And that is where our attention should

be in making sure that we do everything we can to minimize the threats there and support those men and women.

But also, as the chairman said, we are looking to the future, and this series of hearings is upon readiness. The chairman read over a series of numbers that actually made me feel a little bit young to hear how old some of our equipment is.

I am going to ask each one of you, and feel free to be brief in your answer. As the chairman said, one of the most important things we can have is information, to know what you are thinking, what your thoughts are. And so I am going to ask each of you to respond. What is the biggest deficiency that we face right now as we get ready for future challenges? And once again, feel free to be brief.

General BOLGER. Sir, I will start off. The biggest deficiency is time. As much as we enjoy good modernization, we have programs, it is time to train and integrate, put the great people we have together and have time to prepare for full-spectrum operations. And I think you would hear that same thing from any of our sergeants or any of our officers as they prepare that training.

They really need the time not to focus on the Afghan fight or the Iraq stability operations, but to focus on that full-spectrum integration.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay.

General CARLISLE. Sir, I would echo that. I think we have spent 10 years doing what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have got to get that right, and we have got to win, but as I said in my opening statement, the full spectrum and the points that the chairman brought up referenced the growth of, for example, the PRC [People's Republic of China] and their forces. And that is just one, and there are many more that have spent a lot of time expanding.

So, our modernization and our ability to operate in an anti-access air denial environment, in a degraded environment for electromagnetic spectrum, all those are things that we in Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty comfortable with the fact anything more than about 6 feet up the ground we own.

And we don't have to worry about our space capability because it is pretty well—there is not a lot of threat. But that won't be the case wherever we go next. And those are the things that I think that—and it is time, it is practice, it is concentration, it is modernization of the systems, it is—and I know Bruce will probably mention this, but the air-sea battle, the construct that the Department of Navy and Department of the Air Force put together—those are the things that we have really got to move. We got to take—our belief is we really have to go to the next level in joint. We don't need to be joint, we need to be integrated. And we need to go across domains to make things happen.

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral.

Admiral CLINGAN. Sir, I have to echo my shipmates here—time. The Navy has been operating for the last 3 years at a pace that is equivalent to our surge capacity. That has come at a cost where we have been deployed forward so much that time available for maintenance has resulted in a degrade in material readiness.

And the time available for training has caused us to constrain our training to mission-tailored as opposed to the full range of military operations. So as we look forward, we would need time.

And I might say as well that the rate of the stress on the force would be a little bit less, if we were at our aspiration of 313 ships or so as afloat for the force structure.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay.

General.

General TRYON. Sir, I would probably report that in my judgment, jointness across the board is very good. Me and my colleagues here, I think we work together to achieve joint solutions in every instance. One of the ways we do that is through the Global Force Management Board that routinely meets to discuss how forces are going to be used, where they are going to be used and what the economies of scale can be to address the given situation.

And the Marine Corps is postured uniquely perhaps with the United States Navy in a—more than a joint partnership, it is family. And that is evidenced in a recent experience where with the repositioning of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a requirement to reinforce that unit with a battalion became manifest to address the scenario that is developing off the coast of Libya.

1st Battalion 2nd Marines within 20 hours of receiving the execute order deployed into Souda Bay and across that to the amphibious ships and are now positioned off the coast of Libya.

They did that because they are inherently a team that is task-organized and can very quickly and in an agile fashion adapt to the situation. However, I mentioned in my earlier comments about home station equipment sets. That is becoming an increasingly more important issue with us.

As you probably know, a little bit different from the Army, when marines deploy, we take our gear forward with us. For example, as the marines came out of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 40 percent of the equipment that was in Iraq was transferred to Afghanistan without the benefit of a full refurbishment or reset.

So, that gear is still forward and it is undergoing the wear and the tear that is typically associated with combat operations. So, a lengthy answer to your question, but the equipment reset is indeed a priority.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.

And now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to go back to kind of your original comments and, Generals, for all of you. I think every member of this committee wants you to have everything that you need to support the warfighter. And yet as we look at February's numbers, we had an \$8 billion-a-day deficit. That is approximately an aircraft carrier a day, if I understand the pricing correctly.

When we asked DOD for proposals and information, on one hand, we understand that we need additional dwell time for our soldiers, yet we know that they propose to reduce the number of soldiers in the Army by approximately 27,000 and the soldiers in the Marines

by 15,000. We don't have the ships that we need. We don't have the planes that we need. We don't have the vehicles or the equipment that we need.

And I guess as someone who has been here in Congress for less than 3 months, my question is what is wrong with the procurement process at DOD? How do we fix it? Because we cannot—we cannot—sustain an \$8 billion a day deficit in this country. And as you answer those questions, I would like for you to tell me if you think that the national debt and deficit spending is a threat to our security as a country as well.

General BOLGER. Sir, thanks for that question. I will go first, and I would say that I think the national debt and deficit is a concern to all American citizens whether in uniform right now or not, and I know it is for me.

And, sir, your question about procurement and the need for procurement reform, I think what we would say is procurement as written now is designed about making it perfect in every regard as we can, and we probably made it too complicated. And I think we need to settle for just good enough.

I know for the Army, in particular in this war, we have brought a lot of things on to our operational need statement, which doesn't go through the normal procurement process, from small business and from others, good ideas. Maybe of 10 good ideas that are brought to a unit, maybe 8 of them don't work, but 2 of them do.

And among those good ideas that we are currently using today in Afghanistan and Iraq that came to us courtesy of a Marine Corps program like that is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle series that are keeping our soldiers alive on operations, our marines, our sailors, our airmen who are on the ground.

So, I think there is great merit in looking at those so-called operational need or joint operational needs programs as a way ahead for procurement reform. And I hope we will do that.

And then, sir, another thing I would mention, you mentioned the proposed reduction of soldiers. There were two really important caveats on that that I think the Secretary of Defense wisely put on that. And the first was timing.

It is set for the year 2015, which is 4 years from now. That is close in budget and programming terms, but it is a bit distant in terms of strategic and what may happen in the world. So I think we have left ourselves the opportunity to revisit that, if the world conditions alter.

And then the second point is that not only is it close in that regard, the number is not great by itself. Our Active Duty strength is set at 547,400, and this would represent about 5 percent of that. So, with 4 years to prepare, I think we can give the best range of options to you all and to our chain of command as to what type of reduction may make sense, based on the world situation, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General.

General CARLISLE. Sir, I would agree and echo much of what Dan said. Clearly, in my opinion, our economy and our national debt is a national security issue. And I don't think there is any doubt in anybody's mind, certainly in uniform and all Americans, that our economy is one of our strengths itself, so it is something that we have to protect. And I would agree with you 1,000 percent.

On the procurement side and acquisition side, sir, I think all the things that bureaucracy does can sometime inflate costs. I think there is a—and I am not a procurement or an acquisition expert; that is why they let us be the Ops Deps [Operations Deputies], because we are probably not as good at acquisition—but I think that we have a tendency sometimes to go to the exquisite, and we can't afford to go to the exquisite. So, I think good enough is exactly—as Dan said—is right.

I think there are economies of scale. I think there is stability in a program that allows it to go through a process. I think sometimes impatience on the part of a variety of audiences—be it a consumer, the warfighter or job creation, whatever—there are a lot of people that will create impatience, and sometimes that causes problems in your programs as you move forward.

And I couldn't agree more that we have got to get it right, and we have got to fix the procurement and acquisition process in the Department of Defense, if we are going to be able to maintain the level of fielding of our combat forces that we need for the future.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, General.

Admiral CLINGAN. Sir, in regard to the deficit spending, we as a Nation are equally concerned about that challenge going forward to develop solutions. From at least my personal perspective, the Department of Defense, and certainly the Navy budget, is carrying a level of risk this year, fiscal year 2012, and in the out-years as we look at that.

That would cause me to suggest that one of the solutions to the deficit spending that I would not advise is to diminish DOD, and certainly the Navy's budget. I think the Secretary of Defense has said that 2012 is a reduction from what we thought would be an increase, but still an increase. And then as we begin to plan in the out-years, it is pretty flat.

But to cause a decline, I think, at a time when we are trying to reset and reconstitute the force and meet an evolving security environment, that is going to invite multiple concurrent diverse crises, would in fact increase risk.

Regarding procurement, we understand and have been working for a number of years to address that. I believe part of 2012's budget across all Services was to increase the cadre of procurement professionals. And certainly we are looking to do that in the Navy as well as continue and enhance very rigorous oversight.

Just one example, the type of oversight that is in my lane is the requirement. What is the capability requirement to make sure that we can generate the effects necessary on the battlefield that the Nation expects of us?

And so, we don't gold watch them as we might have in the beginning of my career. We are looking for parity or over match sufficient to match the capacity equation. And so, we are taking a holistic approach to resolving the procurement challenges that we face.

General TRYON. Sir, your second question first. I think all of us share concern with respect to the budget deficit and the implications that it has long-term.

To your question or your comment with respect to end strength, I would like to just comment on the fact as this war progressed, both the Army and the Marine Corps were authorized to grow the

force in order to meet the threat that was seen as confronting our Nation.

And the Marine Corps began in 2007 and, in fact, although we achieved the numbers, the end strength, we are still in the process of forming units and will round out in fiscal year 2012 to complete the "Grow the Force" initiative.

Having said that, in August our Commandant directed that we meet and we look deep, we look down range to consider how we might posture ourselves for the future. And based on his direction, we gathered and conducted an internally driven force structure review leveraging lessons learned over the course of the 10 years of combat in order to figure out how we might posture ourselves better in the future, how we do more with less and how we can leverage the capabilities of technology in the operating battlefield environment today to accomplish our mission.

With respect to procurement I am not a programmatic guy. But I would say I think we are informed to a certain extent with the urgent unfilled requirements, the UUNS [Urgent Universal Needs Statement] process that manifested over the course of the Iraq and now the Afghan conflict that facilitated the acquisition of gear that was needed on the battlefield quickly.

And I know that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, is examining exactly the kind of question that you just posed to us to determine how we might better streamline process and accelerate acquisition to achieve the kind of products that we need, the reliable kind of products that we need to succeed in the battlefield.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his question.

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to begin with General Bolger, primarily because your statement is the only one that referenced it. And I would like the other generals and admirals to respond to it as well—on page three of your statement made an interesting comment about the concept of versatile force mix characteristic. We sort of touched upon it earlier, and that is of course using the Guard as well as the Reserves to sort of, I guess, define readiness. And that is what you are looking into the future, I understand your statement is saying, as to how we would then meet readiness requirements.

What I am curious about is, for example, the Guard, Adjutant Generals are basically State appointments. It is a jurisdictional issue, first of all. Secondly, there are funding considerations, that which the State governments may pay for that which the Federal Government pays for.

So, in your perception on how you feel we are moving to this new joint mix force, how do you anticipate actually coming to address jurisdictional concerns? And how are they going to work side-by-side? Guard units are permanent, for one thing. Yours rotate for another. So, how do we do this? I understand wartime, I am just curious about how you anticipate seeing this actually fulfilled for the future in terms of readiness.

General BOLGER. Ma'am, I think that is a great question, a great point. And exactly one of the challenges we are looking at as we—

we refer to it as convert the Guard and Reserve from a strategic Reserve—in other words a force that is primarily gaining readiness, but you use it only in the event of a very major conflict, you know, the Cold War, World War III-type scenario.

We are talking about it now being an operational reserve. And we actually learned a lot from our brothers and sisters in the Air Force on this. The Air Guard and the Air Reserve have been integrated in the Air Force for quite a while. And they also have to deal with the challenges of State duty versus Federal duty.

And so, mirroring a little of what they learned and then modifying it naturally for the needs of ground forces, we think what we do is we are going to prioritize it so that we can serve the Governors and the Adjutants General.

So, if for example, we give a predicted schedule that says, “Five years from now, your brigade that is normally available in your State is going to be rotated in and do combat duty in Afghanistan,” the Governor then has time for he or she and their team to look at that, know that is coming up, and then, I think, make the prudent arrangements for who is going to pick that duty up.

And I think some of the things that have been recommended, and these are cases we have seen, there is an Army Reserve as well that it does not have a State duty, but sometimes they are available.

Could there an arrangement, a task organization that would tell the Governor, “Look, these Active Component forces or these Army Reserve forces will be available to fill the gap while your combat brigade is deployed,” because I think, ma’am, that is the real concern at the State level, and I think rightly so, for homeland missions.

The other thing that helps us, ma’am, is the reorganization that the Department of Defense did when they established U.S. Northern Command and their strong relation to a strengthened National Guard Bureau, because our number one priority is always homeland defense.

We don’t always put most of our forces against it. But should a homeland defense issue occur, everything goes to that first. And I think that was one of the big lessons after 9/11, although most that was handled by local and State elements.

So, we are looking very closely at that, ma’am. But I think this is a fundamental responsibility that goes back to the founding of America with the militia versus the Active Force and the regular forces. And I think it is one that we really got a great opportunity to make some good changes right now, because we got a very veteran Guard and Reserve.

They don’t require that great amount of training and mobilization time they might have needed when they were less well-equipped or less well-trained. They are as veteran as they have ever been in the Army. And I think it really gives us opportunity to solve these challenges that in many cases have existed for quite awhile, ma’am.

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you.

And I do know that the Air Force has done it very successfully. So, if you would, General, if you would respond to that.

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question.

I think we at the United States Air Force, in some ways our mission is uniquely suited to have a mutual capability. And to be honest, we could not—we, the United States Air Force, could not conduct our mission without our Guard and Reserve partners, and it's every part of the mission.

It depends on mission set. Air superiority alert or air defense alert that we that we set in Hawaii with 154th, for example, or the ASA [Air Sovereignty Alert] folks that are scattered and doing an incredible job throughout the Nation for homeland defense, those are, you know, the Title 10, Title 32 question you asked about. But we have worked it out very well.

They are on Title 32 orders till the klaxon goes off. The minute the klaxon goes off, they are on Title 10, and they are doing the mission for NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] or PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] in Hawaii.

So we have worked our way through some of that, and we are sharing everything we have with our brethren here. But it is a unique capability in a lot of ways because of our mission set.

The other thing that I think is that we have gone into the total force enterprise in the case of KC-135s and F-22s, where part of the squadron is Guard, part of it's Active. You have an amazing amount of flexibility when you build total force enterprise like that.

And we still have a lot to learn. There are things we need to do. And with other missions where it is predominantly State. If we have C-130s in the southern part of the country, they can do fire-fighting in the fire seasons. The ability to back those guys up and send more planes out with that capability is, again, those are things that we can continue to work on.

But whether it is the attributes that the Guard and Reserve bring with respect to continuity, which is incredibly valuable, experience, because they generally are very experienced, very good in what they do, I will tell you in my previous job in the 13th Air Force command, that organization could not operate without the Guard and the 109th in the background and supporting us all the time. And so, I think we are fortunate in our ability to do that.

Admiral CLINGAN. Ma'am, thank you for your question.

We have it a little bit easier, not having a Guard force. And so we have embarked in the last decade on a total force concept where we size and shape the Active and Reserve Components in concert with each other.

And we look at what our current demands are, and we assess what the demand will be in the future security environment. And we size and shape the Reserve Component on a real-time basis to make sure that the total force can respond to the requirements that we anticipate.

We also employ our Reserve forces, whether we are involved in a conflict or not, day-to-day as they augment various activities that we have ongoing. So that keeps them refreshed and able to add value when they are called upon.

General TRYON. And Ma'am, like the Navy, we have no National Guard, as you all know. We have a total force concept with our Reserve community and have had a total force concept for a number of years.

Our Reserve, selected Marine Corps Reserve is 39,600 strong. I alluded to a force structure review earlier, and just for point of clarification, our Reserve establishment will remain at 39,600. There will be no change and no impact on our Reserve Force.

We also will tailor our reserve component so that it complements the Active Duty structure that we have. We bring complete units on to Active Duty. They train in our installations. They train side-by-side with the Active Duty forces. And we also utilize some of the unique capabilities in terms of manpower to bring Reserves forward for individual augments to fill joint manning documents and the like.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The chair now recognizes gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schilling, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHILLING. Thank you very much. I appreciate your gentlemen's service to this great Nation.

This past weekend I was actually in Afghanistan and got to see some of the great work that is happening there. Myself and four other members of Congress had the opportunity to walk through a city called Marja, which a little over a year ago, our men and women couldn't land there without taking fire. And we didn't have to wear a vest. So, you know, I just want to thank you for that and the work that is going on over there.

You know, I understand the folks are getting kind of burnt out, lots of tours going across. And, you know, I think a lot of it comes down to, you know, giving them the break and make sure the families are taken care of. And, you know, constitutionally, that is our job as the Congress is to make sure we are well-protected, that our money is spent properly.

And, you know, I think that the one thing that I look at it is the defense of this Nation is huge, because a lot of the other issues that we are dealing with today don't really matter, if we don't have a good defense system.

So I look at it as a top priority to make sure things are spent properly. And then—

Looks like I get the buzzer now—but, you know, when I visited with several of the troops there, they were all very positive, upbeat. And some of them, you know, had been over there for quite some time. And, you know, I guess, we look, you know, to you folks to just kind of help direct us and just help us make good solid decisions on supporting the troops, their families.

You know, I know, I had a personal experience with one of the guys that came back. He had been back home for a couple of years. And about 2 months ago, he ended up taking his life. And it wasn't because of going in and serving the military. It was, you know, it was a broken home and things like that.

But, you know, I think that there are a lot of things that we are taking note of, and we are focusing our efforts into fixing that. But, you know, I just want to thank you for what you are doing.

And, you know, I think with the financial condition of the country, you know, every penny that we spend—you know, the one thing that I was talking to one of my colleagues about yesterday is the fact that when China spends a dollar, they know that dollar, every penny of it, is being spent properly. And, you know, that is

the one thing that we have an obligation to the citizens to do is make sure we spend it properly.

And look forward to just working with you all. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman.

And the gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for all that you are doing.

With all we have been hearing about readiness and our desire, our joint effort to make sure that we are ready and that we are fully equipped and our country is going to be safe in the years to come, I know we have got lots of challenges of equipment and dwell time and other issues.

But at the same time, we are also approaching changing a major, major policy within the military, the repeal of the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy. And I want to get your thoughts about some of those things.

And first of all, with this proposal as it is coming forth, what changes to facilities are you contemplating in order to address privacy concerns of servicemembers? And what is the cost going to be for that?

General BOLGER. Ma'am, I will start out with that. As you know right now, at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the act of Congress that was signed last December, we are carrying out the training—to train our force right now and then provide an assessment. Our Services will provide the best military advice back on what we think those implications will be as we complete this policy change.

I will tell you right now, ma'am, that we are anticipating no change at the facilities. The Army recognizes two sexes—male and female—sexual-orientation neutral, that is whatever. And our goal will be the same, and the standards of conduct will not change.

And what we have found in our training so far, for folks at my age, it is quite concerning in many cases. For folks the age of my son or daughter, they don't know what we are talking about and why it is a big deal. And the ones in the military are more concerned about their next deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq, ma'am.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So but you say right now—is the policy now that men and women servicemembers who have opposite sex attraction shower together and room together, sleep together? Is that the policy now in the facilities?

General BOLGER. Ma'am, right now the policy that we have is that males live with males and females live with the females. We can make an exception for that in combat, and we do. You know, a crew in a vehicle or something like that has mixed sex.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Why do have that separation?

General BOLGER. I am sorry, ma'am?

Mrs. HARTZLER. Why do have separation between facilities between men and women?

General BOLGER. Right now, really, just for privacy reasons and—

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. So we are going make a change your policy so people with the same-sex attraction are being able to shower

together and to sleep in the same area, so why wouldn't we have separate facilities in those cases?

General BOLGER. Well, ma'am, part of it is because, basically, you are not allowed to act out on your inclinations or interest without the permission of the other person. I mean, the military—

Mrs. HARTZLER. And why don't we have men and women, service men and women sleeping in the same areas and showering?

General BOLGER. Well, ma'am, they do not shower together, but they do sleep in the same areas routinely. I mean, that is very common. And we make normal privacy arrangements, because when you are living very close to somebody, you are still—one of the biggest challenges, of course—and I say this as an infantry guy with almost 33 years of service—is to have any kind of personal space in that kind of an environment.

And so people try to allow a little time for somebody to read a letter or for somebody to clean up or something like that without hassling when they can avoid it. So we are used to that. That is one of the things you learn from when you first come into the Service.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. I would like to hear from the other Services, what changes to the facilities you anticipate and what the cost would be.

General CARLISLE. Ma'am, much like the Army, as we work our way through it—and I will take for the record and come back with more specifics, but because it is not primarily in my area of responsibility within the Department of the Air Force—but in talking with the—as we implement this, our intent is very similar in that we will provide privacy.

But additional facilities is not—additional facilities or splitting things up to where you have four different groups of people that have to maintain separation, that is not our intent, as far as I know right now. Again, I will come with more information as you need it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

General CARLISLE. And I would agree with Dan that, you know, the common refrain, and we all think about the turbulence and what it is going to cause, but to a large extent, the younger folks there was—"don't ask/don't tell/don't care" in a lot of cases was the refrain, because they don't necessarily understand it. They have grown up in a different world than we grew up in, so.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you.

Admiral.

Admiral CLINGAN. Thank you for your question, ma'am. The Navy policy is no change at the facilities and, therefore, no related costs. The facilities are based on gender, not sexual orientation.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you.

General TRYON. Ma'am, consistent with the Department of Defense policy, the Marine Corps policy is the same. The focus for successful implementation in our judgment is to concentrate on leadership, professionalism, discipline and respect.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I would like all of you to address how you think that this change will improve the all-volunteer force and not undermine morale, discipline, readiness, recruiting and retention.

General BOLGER. Ma'am, I would offer that the all-volunteer force represents the America that it is drawn from, and it is important that all Americans feel like the military that we are putting on the battlefield is their military.

General CARLISLE. Ma'am, I would echo what has been said by others. It is about professionalism. It is about professional courtesy and respect for one another, regardless. And I can give you my opinion with respect to what I think it will do to the force. I don't think any of us know right now. I think—time will tell.

Having said that, I think if you recruit and retain professional, respectful people, it won't degrade our force at all.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay.

Admiral CLINGAN. The fact is that the current force has a number of individuals with varying sexual orientations. And as we go to recruit, we recruit based on other things—performance and their capabilities and willingness to go do the missions. And so I don't expect that it is going to change the recruiting demographics particularly.

And, certainly, within the Service, once you have been inducted, or whatever the case may be, it is all governed by standards of behavior, which have not changed. So we don't consider in the Navy, based on the planning that we have done and the surveys we have done, that it will have a significant impact at all.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

General TRYON. Ma'am, I think today's all-volunteer force is a tremendous success, and I wouldn't anticipate any changes to that in the future.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would concur we have a wonderful force right now, but I am very concerned that we in this time of war are getting ready to change this radical policy where, just like you said, General, we do not know the implication of it, and so I have a lot of concerns. But thank you for your answers. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the lady for her questions.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to make a comment as far as long-term readiness and then I would like to reengage the near-term readiness issue that we were dialoguing about earlier.

And talking about readiness, of course, it begs the question, "Ready for what?" One of the things that General Bolger mentioned in his early set of remarks is quite remarkable that we have got soldiers right now in a hundred countries. He made the point on time to get missions done and the need for staying power.

When I'm back home in the district, my constituents really don't understand Iraq and Afghanistan. And that is my challenge. I take that on. I explain why it is that we need to stay. We can't afford to start a war that we don't finish. So it is my leadership responsibility to follow through on that.

But I think going forward we need to have—we, the country need to have a national dialogue. I think everyone on this committee, regardless of party, we are fully committed. We are going to protect our cherished way of life, but there are a variety of views and opinions as to what that means.

And I am of the mind that we have too many requirements. We are asking too much of our military right now. And, you know, while I think we could all pass a civics test that we are a republic, not an empire, to me, when I look at the facts, we evidence an empire in terms of where we are laid down.

So, you know, going forward, this is a conversation I am having with my colleagues right now as we look towards completing, successfully completing our objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think that the time is right to take a serious look at what does it mean to protect our cherished way of life as we go forward.

I would like to reengage the topic of near-term readiness. I appreciate all of the responses that I received on that and certainly acknowledge the readiness that was displayed as it relates to moving forces towards any kind of potential response in Libya.

But with regard to the Global Force Management Board, it is my view that we have got risk. We have got significant risk as it relates to the Global Response Force, the GRF. And, of course, that is in large measure because we are resourcing the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But please tell me a little bit more about how you go through that on a joint level and how do you track the status of readiness among the forces and what commitment do we have in the out-years as far as exercises to ensure that we have the capability—because I think the general was getting ready to make a remark about the C-17 availability.

And so the question, really, did you know—you probably did—did you know we had this shortfall, that if we got called, we weren't going to have the capability to move the Global Response Force? And going forward, how much situational awareness do we have about this challenge to readiness, to joint readiness deployability? Thanks.

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. Thanks. I appreciate that question. I think it is. It is a question—and you are exactly right—it is a question of managing risk and ready to do what. And that is your point, so I would reiterate that.

I think in the case of when we look at what is demanded of the United States military today, realizing what we have done for the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is risk out there. There is risk to every part of our force. I don't think there is a part of force that is not at risk.

We spend an exhaustive amount of time, this crowd in particular in the ops deps tanks, and we go through Global Force Management and hard-to-source solutions, and it is a joint solution. And we do turn to one another. And if it is direct support C-130s trying to backfill CH-47s as much as we can, we can't do it across the board, because they don't go to the same place all the time. But we do that.

So we spend a lot of time working joint solutions to issues of how we manage the force in the near-term. And to be honest, and I

think it has been brought up before, with our Army and Marine brethren in their engagements that they have had over the last decade in a lot of cases, some of that has been Air Force and Navy backfill, whether it is joint expeditionary taskings or individual augmentees. And that is exactly what we need to do.

And I think that part of the risk, that we have to realize is that we have incredible men and women in our military, and they are pretty adaptable and flexible. And we can take a computer technician from Lackland Air Force Base or Syracuse, and you can send him to do a joint expeditionary tasking in support of a convoy and they do great work for you.

So we did look at joint solutions. We did look across Services and the synergy. We can do that. And we look to take advantage of our greatest asset, which is our people and their flexibility and adaptability.

General BOLGER. I think, sir, building on what Hawk said, the jointness and the people aspect to me are the two great multipliers we have that allows us to get more out of the numbers of people and planes and ships and tanks and all the other things we have. And we have to look for opportunities to build on that. Anything we can do should always look to empower our folks.

And I think one of the aspects that a little additional dwell time is going to give surely for the Army is the ability to get some of our folks back into professional schooling and some of these broadening experiences where they may have a chance to come over, be an intern for you or something like that, just give them a bigger picture than the world of kicking down the next door in a village in Afghanistan. And then that part is important, but got to get that broader view.

And I think as that generation, with all the skills they are showing and the multiple talents that Hawk referred to, as they take charge of our military, I think we are going to see them come up with some of these solutions. So, you know, it doesn't have to be top down, sir.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, and I appreciate those responses, too.

And, Chairman, I am just going to make about 10 to 15 seconds to close it up.

The thing that is concerning to me is that as we look at the potential threats that we face and we look at the Global Response Force and we think about in terms of joint command and control, joint fires, sustainment capability, mobility and strategic mobility, I think you would agree we have got some risk in terms of identifying the joint forces required to address emerging circumstances.

Now, in situations where we can move a fleet and we have a ground force with a highly trained, motivated, disciplined Marine Corps, that is great. But when we have to go deeper, when we have to reach across and maybe go to the airborne forces, we need a way to convey that force. We need a way to sustain that force and to complement that force. And it is that joint packaging that has got me concerned in the near-term.

I know that that is on your radar screen. And I think it is important we communicate risk as we go forward in the near-term and as we bridge towards what I hope is a more judicious view of the long-term. And we are going to protect this cherished way of life.

I yield back. Thanks very much.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman.

And the next individual for questions is the gentleman from Arkansas.

And before he comes back in, General Tryon, I have a question for you, if I could, on pre-positioning of our stocks. How important is that to the Marines, because one of the things that we are hearing today is that that is not that important, that we have just sustainment vessels, we can pull them back, and we can be back to the fight in a week or two. You have seen that firsthand. How important are those prepositioned stocks?

General TRYON. Sir, thank you. Thank you for that question. The Maritime Preposition Force is comprised of three squadrons that are forward-deployed around the world—one in the Med [Mediterranean], one in the Pacific, and one in the Indian Ocean.

For the Marine Corps and for the program that we have, these are capability sets and not simply floating warehouses that you would draw supplies from. They are intentionally designed to support fly-in echelons and marry up so that formations can quickly assemble in a reception staging area and then complete their onward movement and take on whatever mission that might be there.

This is a strategic program, in my judgment. Having these forces, these assets, these resources forward-deployed I think is fundamentally important, not just to the organizational constructs that the Marine Corps has and how we operate with them, but I think to the combatant commanders as well.

It provides the combatant commanders with what is singularly their most important—it addresses singularly what their most important concern is, and that is responsiveness. And by having maritime preposition assets forward-deployed, we have a far greater ability to respond in time to a crisis or a contingency.

Mr. FORBES. And two questions on that. First one is how important is time to you in that response capability?

General TRYON. Sir, I think time is always of the essence, you know, from the Marine Corps' ethos, First to Fight, we can't get there fast enough. And so we want to make sure that we are where we need to be with what we need to have in order to carry the day. And the way we are organized and equipped and the way the resources that are located aboard the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, or the way they are arranged, they complement our capability to forward deploy quickly.

Mr. FORBES. If we did not have those stocks prepositioned and we had the ships back in homeport, is there a difference in timing between just the sail time to be able to get to wherever the destination is? In other words, how much time does it take to assemble the stocks that you would need on those vessels before they could move forward?

General TRYON. Sir, if the squadron is, for instance, back in the continental United States, East or West Coast, obviously, you would have to deal with whatever the tyranny of distance is between departing the United States and moving to wherever the crisis or the contingency area might be.

Providing that the ships would remain loaded with the stockages that we're required to support, that would minimize delay in moving them forward. But when we sacrifice time, we assume risk.

Mr. FORBES. What if they did not keep those ships loaded?

General TRYON. Sir, that would then require additional time in order to be able to load the vessels and—

Mr. FORBES. Could that be several weeks' time?

General TRYON. Sir, it would depend on the squadron, but it would take a matter of time. And I can get back to you and tell you exactly what the load time for those—for a squadron might be. It depends on port facilities. It depends on the type of ship. There are a number of factors associated with that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 87.]

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Arkansas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this very informative hearing.

Thank you all for your service. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you, General Carlisle, mentioning in C-130s. You know we have a lot of great ones in Little Rock in my district.

General Bolger, I wanted to ask you, when you are dealing with the transition from a strategic Reserve to operational Reserve, can you talk a little bit about how you are going to balance the Guard's role in the States? That is particularly important in a State like Arkansas, where we have a lot of tornadoes and storms and things like that. And I know that they will continue to respond to several incidents like that.

But if you could provide a little guidance, I am particularly interested in the training balance and how they accommodate that in light of a shift to an operational Reserve?

General BOLGER. Sir, that is a great question, and I think it comes down to the fundamental nature of the Guard having arisen out of the militia tradition of the United States, always ready for home service and then, you know, like the old minutemen, and then deploying overseas when necessary.

Now, Guard in particular and our Reserve, too, have done a great job in that for the last decade for the Army. You mentioned the term "operational." In the old days, the Guard really and the Reserve were a strategic Reserve. They were the force to be called on when things really got big and maybe in the Cold War where we were looking at a major World War III-type scale of conflict.

So now we use about 70,000 guardsmen and reservists on Active Duty today every day, really keeping them on Active Duty, a good number deployed overseas. And so, how do we balance that with the Governor's needs and expectations that their Guard would be available in the event of a state of emergency or a natural disaster?

Two things we have done that I think are helping us in that area, sir. The first is trying to get the Guard and Reserve, and the Guard in particular, for State duty on a predictable schedule of deployment, which is to say about 4 years at home for every year deployed.

If a Governor knew that he or she would have that Guard available for 4 years out of 5, then they know at least that 80 percent

of the time is covered with a trained, ready unit that knows the State and that lives there and is ready to go. And I think our Guard has done really, really well on these homeland tasks.

And then, what about the year where they are going to get mobilized, deployed, and deployed overseas? I think this brings us to the second point. Secretary McHugh and General Casey actually commissioned a study led by General Dennis Reimer, one of our former Army chiefs of staff. Lieutenant General Roger Schultz, Lieutenant General Helmly helped them out with this. They were key leaders in the Guard and Reserve.

And they came back and they said, you know, we need to look at a way to create more of a total force for homeland missions as well. Maybe we can see a future with some changes to how we task organize where the Governor, he or she might have able if the Guard brigade was deployed, they could have Army Reserve forces resident in that State, which are Federal forces and Reserve. They could have active Army units registered in that State. And all that would come together.

And, sir, of course we have had some great and hard-won lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, from Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, from the flooding as recently as this month in the United States, where we have seen some opportunities there to really get a better homeland force.

And, sir, I would underscore that in the direction we received from the President and the Secretary of Defense, homeland defense is the number one responsibility of the Department of Defense. And normally, our forces are not doing that every day, but they are all available and should an event occur in the homeland, just as we saw after 9/11, everything will have that direction until that event is dealt with, sir.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Sure. I got in the Reserve in 1996, am still in the Reserve now, and I can tell you the clear difference between the 1996 strategic Reserve and the operational now, and particularly in terms of readiness. We call this the Readiness Subcommittee. I don't think I have ever heard the word "readiness" until post 9/11 in the Reserve, and everything changed. So I know exactly what you are talking about there.

I want to ask you about an issue that is more about personnel, not equipment, and that is OERs, Officer Evaluations—to some extent, NCOERs [Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Reports] as well for noncommissioned officers, but I am particularly interested in our leaders and how they are rated. I am waiting on an OER now as I am leaving my Reserve unit, and I have written and rated folks, so I am intimately familiar with OERs.

And there was a great article in *The Atlantic* magazine about a month ago, and it talked about John Nagl and a bunch of the really sharp military leaders who have gotten out of the Army. And I know that we have taken steps, particularly in the last decade or 5 years, to be more innovative to encourage the cliché "outside the box" thinking. I saw that firsthand when I went to Fort Dix to phase one of ILE [Intermediate Level Education].

Instead of a lecture format where you just sit, take notes and listen to an officer, you sit in a sort of a horseshoe, you are given all

these hypotheticals, you are encouraged to think and to dialogue and to——

It was actually surprising to me to see that kind of freedom in thinking and in structure in the military. And I was encouraged by it because I thought that it was teaching folks how to think instead of how to memorize some things that they would probably soon forget.

So, I know that you all have—that there has been an evolution. I know we are making progress. But I think the way that people are rated—and I am sort of laying it as a predicate so you can comment on it—I think the way people are rated and then the way they are assigned is of concern to me.

The *Atlantic* article mentioned that, first of all, as I have seen on the OER side, you see just all sorts of inflation where no one gets any negative comments, because a negative comment, God forbid, completely ruins their career.

So you get at least good things said about you. And then if you did a really good job, you get extraordinary things said about you, but nothing bad, because then your career is dead, particularly as an officer, particularly as a field-grade officer. So the artificiality of the OER process is a concern to me.

On the assignment side, what concerns me is—and the *Atlantic* article, I commend it to you, if you haven't read it—but it talks about the fact that commanders don't have the ability to develop relationships with individual soldiers and seek those individual soldiers out on a routine basis for assignment.

You get to know a soldier, you see that they are well-suited for this position or that position, you seek them out, and say, "This is the one I want." Now there may be some of that at your level. You probably have the ability to get whoever you want working for you.

But down at, particularly, at the company-grade level and moving into the field-grade level, those assignments do sometimes seem random. They don't seem connected with the history of the individuals involved. And so I would just ask, if you could, to comment on that.

And I would welcome anybody's comments on this, because I think that a lot of these leaders in the Army go on to lead in the civilian world. Sometimes, though, we lose them too soon from the military, and they get out not because they are ready to get out and they have had a fulfilling career, but many times, they are ready to get out because they are frustrated with the system.

And if you would address that—sorry for the long question—but if you would address that, I would appreciate it.

General BOLGER. Well, sir, I think it is actually a very fundamental question because the military is all about people. And our goal, as you know, is when anybody joins the Army, we see every soldier, every private as a potential leader.

And whether they stay in and become noncommissioned officers, warrant officers or commissioned officers or whether they do their time and get out with an honorable discharge and go to civil life, in any case, we think we have some leader development responsibilities to everyone. And we really do.

So, even in our basic training, even in our very low level training, there are some of those folks who get leadership responsibil-

ities. And we encourage that, because as we have seen over and over in the current fight, it really is a couple of privates first class or a young sergeant who are often having to make some very, very critical decisions that can have strategic implications.

You mentioned evaluation, our officer evaluation. The current one has been around for about over 20 years, and we are about due to relook it. In fact, General Casey has directed that we come back with some options on some changes we may need to make, and maybe expand the way we do evaluations.

At least for the Army, we are still pretty traditional in the sense that you are evaluated by your chain of command, your immediate commander and then commander one level up. There is some thought that maybe you need to get some peer feedback involved in that. There is some thought that maybe we need to hear from subordinates, you know, get what would be called in industry a 360-degree view.

Now how do you do that in a hierarchical organization with a uniformed court of military justice—we have to work our way through that. But I think we have got an innovative enough force, so we can come up with some options there, sir. And since you have got some views on that, I will take back to our task force to come see you, because you have got some unique perspectives where we are at now.

Sir, the final comment had to do sort of with, for want of a better term, what makes a young person stay in the military? And the answer is unique to every man and woman, but I think for the people who reach that crossroad when they decide to stay in or get out, it really has to do with one thing. “Am I making a difference? Does the Army think that what I am doing is doing something?”

I think some people think it is because of money or because of rank or because of getting an award. I don’t think that is it. I think folks, they come in and they swear in front of the American flag, and they know it is an important task they do when they put on a uniform. And they want to make that contribution. And I think it is incumbent on us in our leader development to give them that opportunity to use their talents, sir.

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you for that.

And we thank the gentleman from Arkansas for his service. And if you have any other thoughts, if you could get back with the gentleman, I know he would love to work with you on doing that.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would like to work with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. General, we just have a couple of questions left. And I would just like to—since you got the microphone warmed up, General Bolger, I will just ask you. You have a unique perspective on jointness—that was the question that was asked a little bit earlier—because you were Chief Strategy Division J-8, and later you were Director of Strategy & Analysis J-5 in Joint Forces Command.

How important is jointness to the Army? And when the flag goes down on the Joint Forces Command, who will have the legal authority to put together the teams within the Services that the Joint Forces Command currently have?

General BOLGER. Sir, I think that is a great question. Jointness for us really—and this has been long-standing in the American military, I mean, you can go all the way back to our origins when we were first working with the Army and the Navy and the Marines and then got the Air Force as an independent Service after World War II—it is absolutely critical.

No single Service in the United States can carry out a task by itself. We need the team, and we are representative of a much larger team, obviously. You are right, sir, I had the privilege to serve at Joint Forces Command and to see that in action, because that command is charged with really enhancing and strengthening jointness across the force.

And I think the proof is in the operations. I mean, there are things that we have been able to carry out since the Goldwater-Nichols Reform with Joint Forces Command, in many cases providing leadership, and the Services themselves working well together under the Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. I think we have been able to achieve a lot.

And I think, sir, your question that you asked that is really important is, as Joint Forces Command is disestablished and their responsibilities are put elsewhere, who really brings the team together? And, sir, my understanding of the law is that the statutory authority rests with the Secretary of Defense, always has, I mean, and obviously, with the President as well.

Mr. FORBES. The Secretary obviously can't do that on a day-to-day basis like the Joint Forces Command did.

General BOLGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Does it rest anywhere else?

General BOLGER. Sir, it does. Combatant commanders have that authority right now.

Mr. FORBES. Do they shift between Services?

General BOLGER. They do. For example, in Central Command, General Mattis can make task organization changes as necessary. General Ham, who just took over Africa Command, is making some significant ones right now, as he postures for potential contingencies in North Africa. So that is a combatant commander. That responsibility is delegated to them from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

And that is one of the reasons Joint Forces Command in particular was a command that had a great deal of utility in the time that it was there.

We are currently in the middle of preparing plans to make sure that the core capabilities of Joint Forces Command are preserved and I think, sir, we may have to come back to you all through the, obviously, through our Service departments and through the Secretary of Defense on potential authorities or something that may need to shift, as that organization transitions from being a combatant command to whatever it is when we are complete with this execution.

Mr. FORBES. One last question on that, you talked about the teams. One of the teams that has been put together very uniquely has been the team of Joint Forces Command in terms of their ability to do jointness. Do you know of any other place in the world

that has that unique set of individuals that have that kind of experience and expertise in doing that?

General BOLGER. Sir, I think you make a really good point. It is unique in the United States Armed Forces. It is unique worldwide among our allies. As you know many of our allies come through Supreme Allied Command transformation, which is headquartered in Norfolk, to work with us in that joint environment and to understand our hard-won lessons that go all the way back to the World Wars and such, what we have learned about operating in that joint environment.

That workforce that lives in that area is very, very unique, and I can tell you at least in the planning that we are doing so far, sir, that is a strong consideration. How do we keep the core of that team together? How do we maintain that hard-won expertise? How do we continue to build it for the future? Because jointness will be just as important a year from now or 5 years from now or 10 years from now as it is today, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

General Carlisle, just a quick question for you. You saw the charts we had on China and one of the things we are worried about is the modernization of our air force. You have to watch those airmen get into those planes and defend freedom around the world.

How concerned are you with readiness capabilities when we look at the growing modernization of China's military and what should we be expecting for that in the next 5, 10, 15 years?

General CARLISLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Great question. And I think my brother here, my shipmate Bruce, said to add this. You know certainly in the air component or the cross-domain space component, cyberspace component, air, maritime, we look at where they are putting so many of their resources, and it is a big concern because for the last 10 years our focus has been in Iraq and Afghanistan and theirs has been on modernizing.

I mean, it is a statement of fact. And they are doing it in their subsurface. They are doing it in their surface fleet. They are doing it in their air. They are doing it in their space and counter-space capability as well as in the known cyberspace.

So it is very big concern, and I think Admiral Willard probably thinks about it every day when he gets up and every night when he goes to bed.

I think that with respect to readiness, I think there is qualitative advantage that we still possess, despite their rolling out of their newest airplane. And in our legacy and new systems is our current hedge against what they are doing. I believe our future—a successful F-35 program for all the Services, a successful long-range strike capability, a successful SSBN and DDG fleet—all those things are critical as we move forward.

And this is a time I believe with respect to future readiness that as we make this transition and as we back out the forces out of Iraq and we look to investments in the future and given the economy and the deficit that we have to deal with, we have got to do those right in how we modernize into the future so that we can still maintain our influence throughout the world that we have today.

So, again, I mentioned the other day to you, Mr. Chairman, you can't make them 10 feet tall, because they are not. But you also

can't disregard them. There is an area there where you have to pay very, very close attention to what they are doing and why they are doing it and what we will do to maintain our capability to influence and maintain our capability, in particular in that part of the world.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

One last question from me then I think Ms. Bordallo has one final question.

Admiral, one of the concerns we all have—and you and I have talked about this—is with ship maintenance. And we are looking at fiscal year 2010. We had a \$200 million shortfall. We don't have a fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2012, we are looking about \$367 million shortfall.

At what point, with the all of the surge time that you were talking about earlier with the deferred maintenance that we have, do we start becoming concerned that we need to have a reevaluation of the service life of the vessels that we have?

Admiral CLINGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. We obviously look to share risk across the Navy's entire portfolio. And one of the areas that we are reluctant to share risk in is the maintenance, because we are absolutely dedicated to get our fleet to its expected service life.

Since 2009 through the 2012 budget, we have added \$800 million to the maintenance program. We have shifted manpower from staffs and units back to the ships themselves and to the shore-based maintenance so that we can address this. We have increased our planning capacity, and we have developed class maintenance plans, and within that, individual ship plans.

So, we have put ourselves on a path which didn't begin this year, but, frankly, a year or 2 ago, to make sure that we can plan and execute maintenance with more precision and finely tuned to get those ships into the condition they need to be.

That doesn't mean that the shortfall doesn't concern us. And as we look at a couple of drivers, the continuing resolution will put us behind the expected maintenance and, therefore, the material condition of some number of ships I mentioned. Twenty-nine of 85 availabilities, if the continuing resolution goes through the balance of this year, will not be accomplished. That will back wave or backlog into what we had in terms of shortfalls for fiscal year 2012.

And as we look out to the coming years, that was why I mentioned earlier the Secretary's funding profile in regard to lessening the increase this year and then flattening in the out-years was what we thought was a righteous contribution to the Nation's deficit challenges.

If we were to find a decline in the DOD or Navy budget in this particular case, we would be concerned again about our ability to maintain the ships and get them to service life, considering the balance of the portfolio that has equal requirements as well.

Mr. FORBES. Just want to just elaborate on that answer just a little bit if I could.

And then Ms. Bordallo, you have the final question.

Explain to me, if you would, the impact in terms of lost maintenance capabilities in dollars that we would have, if the continuing resolution continues.

And then, help me explain to other members of Congress, who tell me the Navy is coming in and telling us that they are going to have this enormous problem on the CR, if they don't get that—if that continues with maintenance—and that is going to be horrible—but they are not so worried about the \$567 million shortfall that was budgeted and the impact that that is going to have.

And maybe I am not articulate on my questioning, but help me bridge those gaps.

Admiral CLINGAN. Yes, sir. Every budget, of course, is built on the preceding year. And so while we might, as we manage material readiness risk across our fleet, making sure that the ships that we deploy and the aircrafts that we push forward are prepared to do the mission in terms of their material condition, we have a backlog of some maintenance that has accumulated for a variety of reasons over the last 3 years.

One of them has been, as I mentioned earlier, time. As we have operated at surge tempo, both training time and maintenance time has been constrained. That has caused us to reduce the scope of maintenance done on ships, sometimes to forego doing the maintenance all together, and there has been a shortfall in the funding of the maintenance as well.

But that is a manageable risk, as we work just in time to get the capacity we need for deployments and for our surge obligations, in case of unforeseen circumstances or crises. When you then walk into the continuing resolution, it takes that risk that we are managing temporarily year to year, and it adjusts the calculus.

As I mentioned, we did not anticipate 29 of 85 availabilities not being completed. And so that is an exacerbation of the problem of 29 ships that didn't get maintenance that we expected that would. And then, that, of course, for the budget under consideration today, fiscal year 2012, the \$367 million shortfall in availabilities, again, is managing risk across a whole number of considerations.

But that additional 29 plus the availabilities in terms of scope and number that we were planning on carrying in 2012 is now disproportionately risky. It doesn't mean it has become intolerable, but it is carrying more risk than we anticipated. And, of course, we would like to mitigate that by some budget solution for 2011 and then get on with 2012.

Mr. FORBES. If you have the opportunity to do it, I don't expect you to do it today, but at some point in time, could you supply our committee with a list of what maintenance that \$560 million would incorporate? In other words, what are we doing? Because everybody's tolerable risk maybe somebody else's intolerable risk.

And we would just like to take a look at that, to get a snapshot of what risk we are taking by not doing that maintenance. Is that is something that you could do at some particular point in time for us for the record?

Admiral CLINGAN. I would be pleased to.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.

Now, I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member for her final question.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, of course, you know coming from Guam and with the military buildup you know my questions will be centered to General Tryon.

General, can you address concerns about training capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. The QDR stated, "Finally, the United States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for constant readiness of U.S. forces to carry out joint operations."

So, that is the written statement there. Now, one of my concerns, General, I have long expressed, and, of course, Guam is looking forward to the 8,600 marines from Okinawa. We are welcoming the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces. And as you probably know, these are the same forces that liberated Guam 65 years ago, so our people look at it as a homecoming.

But I have long expressed my concern about the preferred alternative location for the firing ranges on Guam. Although the problematic agreement has been signed by our governor a couple of days ago, there are still concerns about this property.

And I, along with Senator Webb, have urged that DOD to look more closely at Tinian for the firing ranges. And that is our neighboring island in the Northern Marianas. The Marine requirement seemed to have shifted since the beginning of the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] process in 2006, so I remain skeptical that the land on Guam needed for the range can be leased by the Department of Defense.

Now, what I wanted to get from you today in a statement for the record is—what is it? We have never really received any specific information about why is it more advantageous for training on Guam versus Tinian. And I would think that more virtual urban-style training could be done in Guam and live fire in Tinian. Could you comment on that?

General TRYON. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for your question. Obviously, we are still early in the implementation of the AIP [Agreed Implementation Plan] process.

The Commandant's intent in the Pacific is really threefold—first, to ensure that the marines are properly positioned in the Pacific writ large to respond to whatever threat and to support our national security objectives and that wherever marines are, that they have the ability to properly train in order to be prepared for those contingencies and, last but certainly not least, that wherever marines are, that their quality of life meets standards and promotes a high state of morale and readiness.

Guam is clearly strategically located in the Pacific region and offers unique advantages to forward-deployed forces that provide us with a flexible response. We are indeed working with the government of Guam right now with respect to ranges and our ability to train.

We have recently entertained, I think as you know, the governor of Guam and had the opportunity of taking him down to Quantico to show him some of our operational ranges and provide him with a perspective as to how we operate our ranges, the safety measures and margins that are associated with range operation, and how we cohabit side-by-side with the civilian communities that adjoin our various bases.

The Department of the Navy is our lead in conducting the dialogue with Guam. The guiding principles that the Under Secretary is using in his dialogue is that first and foremost, OneGuam, as you know, that we will coordinate projects that meet both the Marine Corps' needs as well as the needs of the government of Guam in terms of infrastructure and the like; Green Guam that will protect the natural resources and promote energy efficiency; 24/7 access to Pagat, into Pagat Cave, the cultural sites that are on the eastern side of the island; and that we will also minimize the footprint that the Marine Corps has on the island with the goal of a net negative land acquisition strategy.

At this point in time, we are still stepping through the pros and cons of what kind of a range can be constructed adjacent to Route 15 on Guam.

The downside of having a range off the island is a couple of things. First, marines would not have immediate access to a range or training area, which again goes back to the question of time and risk in the event that we have to deploy quickly. Field-firing weapons and preparing for a rapid move would require close and ready access to ranges.

Transportation to off-island training creates a time requirement. It generates additional operational and maintenance expense. And at this point in time, we haven't conducted enough of an assessment on any of the off-island—the potential off-island training sites to understand whether they can even meet our training requirements or not.

So, it is very much a work in progress, ma'am. And I don't want to not answer your question, but I also don't want to make a statement that would be conjecture.

Ms. BORDALLO. So, in other words, no definite decisions have been made, and as you said it is a work in progress.

General TRYON. It is, indeed, a work in progress, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, Generals, we want to thank you for your service to our country. Thank you so much for what you do to train and protect our men and women in uniform. We really appreciate you taking time to be with us today.

I think I speak for the Ranking Member, our door is open to you at any time that there is something you see that we need to be doing to help the readiness of our country. We just have an open invitation, and we just appreciate your help in helping us do that job we need to do.

Thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 10, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 10, 2011

Statement of Chairman J. Randy Forbes (R-Virginia)
House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Global Challenges to Readiness and the Fiscal Year 2012
Budget Request
March 10, 2011

I want to welcome all of our members today to what I believe will prove to be one of our most important hearings of the year. We have the opportunity to discuss not only the state of military readiness today, but to also look to the future readiness needs of the force. Joining us today are four exceptional witnesses representing each of our military services.

They are:

- Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army
- Lieutenant General Hawk Carlisle
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force
- Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy, U.S. Navy
- Lieutenant General Richard T. Tryon
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps

These four distinguished gentlemen are often referred to as the “Ops Deputies” or “Ops Deps” inside the Pentagon. They are charged with not only formulating policy to advance their service’s core missions, but they are also responsible for determining the operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to support the national security objectives and military strategy.

Gentlemen, we are truly honored to have you join us today and we are extremely grateful for all you do to keep this nation safe. Thank you for your service.

This hearing is the second in a series of hearings we are holding to ask the question “Are we ready?” Last week’s testimony by our panel of independent witnesses was extremely thought-provoking, and I believe it serves as a great framework for our discussion today. The witnesses all emphasized that our force levels are inappropriately sized and apportioned to respond to challenges of current global environment. Ms. Eaglen also illuminated the fact that our nation’s Armed Forces are approaching a “geriatric state.”

To give our members a few specific examples of what that really means:

- Our surface fleet has an average age of 19 years;
- The average age of our strategic bombers is 34 years;
- The average age of the C-130H fleet—which I know many members are familiar with because we often fly on them when we go on CODELs—is 23 years;
- Our Air Force tanker fleet is over 46 years; and
- The Marine Corps amphibious assault vehicle fleet has an average age of 38 years.

Not only have we allowed our ships and aircraft to reach this “geriatric” state, but we have also downsized our inventory.

- In 1990, we had the equivalent of 76 Army combat brigades. Today that number is 45.
- In 1990, we had 546 Navy ships. Today we have 286.
- In 1990, we had 82 Air Force fighter squadrons. Today we have the equivalent of 39.
- In 1990, we had 360 strategic bombers. Today we have 162, and the Air Force wants to retire 6 of these before the next one is even fielded.

We find ourselves postured in this manner at a time when China has rapidly grown and modernized its military. I call your attention to [this chart](#) (below), which depicts the growth in China’s surface fleet, submarine force, air force and air defense between 2000 and 2009.


We cannot afford to allow a budget target to be the sole governing basis in our decisions today or we will bear an enormous cost in the future. I like to refer to this as the instant pudding mindset. We have grown accustomed to

quick solutions and fast results. However, the outcomes, in many cases, have been devastating.

There will be no instant pudding solutions to these challenges we face. We must break our dependence on deficit spending, right our entitlement programs, unleash our labor force, and reorder our federal government if we are going to successfully respond to China's economic momentum and military buildup.

Once again, I'm very thankful to our distinguished witnesses and I look forward to our discussion.

Select PLA Modernization Areas, 2000 - 2009



STATEMENT BY

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL P. BOLGER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
OPERATIONS, PLANS AND POLICY
UNITED STATES ARMY**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

MARCH 10, 2010

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, our Chief of Staff, General George Casey, and the more than one million Soldiers who serve in the National Guard, Army Reserve and are on active duty, thank you for this opportunity to report to you on the state of Army readiness. I welcome this opportunity and I pledge to provide you forthright and honest assessments. On behalf of the Army, thank you for your steadfast support and commitment to our men and women in uniform. The American people's support sustains us in the current fight and allows us to reset returning Soldiers and equipment for the next fight, wherever that may be.

Our Army defends our citizens and our interests. Today's world is marked by persistent conflict. States square off across disputed borders, with farmland, water, oil, and people at issue. Terrorist groups move in the shadows, bent on lethal designs. Resources, climate effects, ideologies, religions—the causes of trouble are many. Americans would hope that this sort of thing won't affect our homeland. But it has, with airliners used as battering rams, buildings smashed open, and nearly 3000 dead. There have been other attempts. There will be more.

Persistent conflict is our challenge, our "if" proposition. So what's our "then" statement? What are we doing about it?

As Soldiers, we have an answer. We've planned, and are building, a balanced Army ready to meet this violent 21st century. Our G-3/5/7 team has a big role in this. We're in league with the Army Staff, the Secretariat, the major

commands, and numerous uniquely capable direct reporting units. In partnership with our allies and friends, linked with our country's other superb Armed Forces, we're moving out. The vision from our Secretary and our Chief of Staff is clear: *a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational basis. This is the right answer for the long haul.*

A versatile force mix characterizes our Army. At the broadest level, we combine full time Regular Army Soldiers with citizen-Soldiers of our Army National Guard and Army Reserve. This multi-component team realizes the far-sighted thinking of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams. They saw what happened in Vietnam, when America tried to persist in an unpopular conflict without calling out the strength of the nation. The volunteers and draftees fought hard and with great valor. But we did not engage the full strength of the nation. In the end, the sacrifices weren't enough. Our country lost heart—and lost the war.

So Laird and Abrams, among others, ensured that our volunteer Army was purpose-built to require citizen mobilization for all but the most transient operations. They insisted on integration of combat, combat support, and combat service support formations in a versatile mix that tied together Active and Reserve elements at every echelon. Although our Army has shifted from the Cold War division-based model to our present modular brigade-centric approach, we consciously preserved this wise Active-Reserve team. Our Reserve components are no longer just a strategic back-up, as they were in the past, but a well-equipped, highly trained, and battle-wise operational force. More than

60,000 Guardsmen and Reservists are in the fight daily. Their effectiveness in combat has been clear.

Moreover, the effect at home matters. We have been mobilizing about thousands of Guardsmen and Reservists each year since 9-11, bringing men and women to the colors from farms and factories in every county and city in our land. This has ensured continued public support of our Soldiers even when the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven frustrating and costly. Our enemies thought we would quit. They thought wrong.

The diverse ranks of our Active and Reserve volunteer Army truly represent all of America, and while a good thing in itself, that meritocratic recruitment also brings practical military benefits. We have enlisted a lot of high-end talent. We value education and training. While Soldiers certainly know the goodness in discipline and repetition of core battle tasks—our Drill Sergeants remain tough and demanding as ever—we also prize perception and innovation. Our Army reorganized to modular brigade combat teams, switched gears to population-centric counterinsurgency in Iraq, and altered strategy in Afghanistan, all done on the move during an ongoing war as far from home as you can be. In this, we epitomized the prescient thoughts of historian and World War II veteran Sir Michael Howard: "I am tempted to say that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter. What does matter is their ability to get it right quickly, when the moment arrives."

That agility of mind didn't just spring up from the dirt. It reflects decades of commitment to leader, individual, and collective training, epitomized in our premier Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and in the combat training centers at Hohenfels, Fort Irwin, Fort Leavenworth, and Fort Polk. Our Army teaches itself better than most. You can see it in our coursework, on our gunnery ranges, in the forward theaters, and even in cyberspace, courtesy of forums like companycommand.army.mil and its many partners. The feedback loops are many. The adjustments are quick.

Among those refinements has been an ongoing effort to create tailorable and networked organizations appropriate to modern warfare, especially against irregular foes. To echo Sir Michael Howard, the organization of our modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) may not be perfect, but they got it right quickly. We have 73 of them right now, backed by 229 other brigades. Because of the versatility of their basic design and the skills of the Soldiers in their units, these brigades can carry out a wide range of tasks across the full spectrum of military operations.

Consider the experience this year of our Global Response Force, the Paratroopers of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division. In January of 2010, they were in Haiti, providing disaster relief in the wake of a devastating earthquake. By May they were in Afghanistan, helping to train new elements of the local security forces. This spring, they will return to Iraq to oversee stability operations. That is what one Army brigade can do. There are 301 more.

To gain this agility takes more than good leaders and able Soldiers, and much more than the right wiring diagram. It requires a commitment to knowledge and networking as enablers. The former Future Combat System (FCS) made "the Network" central to our fighting approach. Although FCS is gone, the Network is alive, well, and growing. Its present and projected list of constituent systems includes acronyms like WIN-T and JTRS, GCCS-A and TIGR-Net, but the real strength is in the idea. With the Network, we intend to share situational awareness in real time from Soldier level to the high command, "from mud to space" as they say in TRADOC, bringing in the other Armed Forces, our allies and our friends. We are not there yet. But we are getting there.

The evolving Network ties together a modernizing Army that hasn't waited for the latest and greatest new weapons. Rather, we've brought them to the field rapidly, to be certain our Soldiers go well-armed into harm's way. Before this war, we didn't have CH-47F Chinooks, M-777 155mm howitzers, Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles, or Stryker Mobile Gun Systems, let alone a profusion of unmanned aerial vehicles, night sights, thermal imagers, and the like. That's the power of Army modernization.

To bring this tailored, networked, modernized combat power to bear, not just once, but season after season, year after year, we have learned to operate on a rotational basis. The Army has used other models in the past, to include tiered readiness and individual replacements. Yet the historical record is pretty clear from British, French, and American experience (among others), that if you want to field forces that can hang together for the long haul, a unit solution is the

best. Groups have the solidarity to give their individual Soldiers strength. You go out and back together. It may not be the most "efficient" for those devoted solely to ledger books. But it has proven effective indeed in meeting the demands of persistent conflict.

Led by our Forces Command (FORSCOM), with the entire Army participating, we're well on the way to institutionalizing this rotational scheme, what we call Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). In this effort, we've combined the experience of the present war with the models offered by our Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force comrades. Those services have been delivering a predictable supply of aircraft carrier battle groups, Marine expeditionary units, and air expeditionary wings for years. Now we have begun to do likewise.

It has been hard. The demand for our forces has exceeded the supply, even with our growth to 1.1 million strong (547,400 active, 358,200 Army National Guardsmen, and 206,000 Army Reservists) and our expansion to 73 BCTs and 229 other brigades. Only with the planned reduction in our commitment to Iraq can we gain the time needed to reset and rebalance our force. These campaigns have taken a toll on our equipment and on us all.

Over this year, we're working to establish a predictable, supply-based output of one corps, five divisions, twenty BCTs, and 90,000 enabling troops. For units deploying after October 1, 2011, we expect to achieve one year "boots on the ground" (BOG) followed by two years at home (dwell) for the Active elements and one to four for the Reserve component, headed to a sustained rate of 1:3 and 1:5. For our Soldiers and especially for our families, that BOG: dwell

ratio is the metric they watch most. It's the sure indicator that we can stay at it as long as it takes.


Our Army will continue to do what our country asks. With the continued support of the American people, expressed through the will of the Congress the Army will restore balance in the force, build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict, and remain ready for the challenges of today and tomorrow. Again, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of the Army and our American Soldiers.



United States Army

Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
United States Army
200 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
Since: May 2010



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

The Citadel – BA – History
University of Chicago – MA – History
University of Chicago – PHD – History

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

FOREIGN LANGUAGES None recorded

PROMOTIONS DATE OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	13 May 78
1LT	7 Jun 80
CPT	1 Dec 81
MAJ	1 Jul 89
LTC	1 Jul 93
COL	1 Jun 98
BG	1 Aug 04
MG	2 Sep 07
LTG	7 May 10

FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Jan 79	Jun 82	Weapons Platoon Leader, C Company, later Executive Officer, B Company, later S-4 (Logistics), 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 34th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia
Jun 82	Dec 83	Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 34th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia
Dec 83	Jul 84	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Aug 84	Jun 86	Student, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
Jun 86	Jun 89	Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
Jul 89	Jun 90	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 90	Jun 91	S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea
Aug 91	May 93	Assistant G-3 (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jun 93	May 94	Senior Speechwriter, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC
Jun 94	Jul 96	Commander, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jul 96	Jul 97	G-3 (Operations), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Aug 97	Jun 98	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jul 98	Jul 00	Commander, 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea
Aug 00	Jun 02	Chief, Strategy Division, J-8, later Director, Strategy and Analysis, J-5, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

LTG Daniel P. Bolger

Jun 02	May 04	Chief of Staff, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea
Jun 04	Jan 05	Assistant Division Commander (Support), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Feb 05	May 05	Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jun 05	Jun 06	Commanding General, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Aug 06	Apr 08	Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, Fort Polk, Louisiana
Apr 08	Feb 09	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Feb 09	Dec 09	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division/ Commanding General, Multi-National Division Baghdad OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jan 10	Jan 10	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division/Commanding General, United States Division-Baghdad, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jan 10	Apr 10	Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Apr 10	May 10	Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army, United States Army, Washington, DC
May 10	Present	Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, United States Army, Washington, DC

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Chief, Strategy Division, J-8, later Director, Strategy and Analysis, J-5, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia	Aug 00-Jun 02	Colonel
Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Feb 05-May 05	Brigadier General
Commanding General, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Jun 05-Jun 06	Brigadier General
Commanding General, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, Fort Polk, Louisiana	Aug 06-Present	Brigadier General


SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Feb 05-Jun 05	Brigadier General
Commanding General, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Jun 05-Jun 06	Brigadier General
Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division/ Commanding General, Multi-National Division Baghdad OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Feb 09-Dec 09	Major General
Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division/Commanding General, United States Division-Baghdad. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq	Jan 10-	Major General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
 Bronze Star Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Combat Action Badge
 Expert Infantryman Badge
 Parachutist Badge
 Air Assault Badge

United States Air Force



Testimony

Before the House Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness

***Are We Ready? The
President's Fiscal Year 2012
Budget Request and Global
Challenges to Readiness***

Statement of
Lieutenant General Herbert J. Carlisle
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans
and Requirements
United States Air Force

March 10, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1. Introduction

The United States continues to confront a dynamic international environment requiring the military to remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats. Along with our Joint partners, the Air Force defends and advances the interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities across the full spectrum of operations required to succeed in today's fight and future conflicts. The Air Force remains a mission-focused and highly prepared force, a difficult task given over 20 years of constant combat operations.

2. Daily Ops and Readiness

Our enduring commitment to readiness and the Joint fight is evident in the missions being accomplished by nearly 37,000 American Airmen deployed to 135 locations across the globe. Last year the Air Force conducted more than 45,000 sorties supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/NEW DAWN and almost 101,000 sorties supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, delivered over 1.78 million passengers and 712,000 tons of cargo, and employed almost 2,580 short tons of munitions. Additionally, we have transported nearly 86,000 patients from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), and our combat search and rescue forces met the "golden hour" goal of transporting seriously wounded warriors to treatment facilities within 60 minutes of injury nearly 98 percent of time. Our aeromedical evacuation sorties moved critically injured warriors to regional hospitals within hours of injury, contributing to the 98 percent battlefield injury survival rate. Lastly, we achieved a record 76 consecutive successful National Security Space launches since 1999. This high operations tempo challenges our ability to maintain readiness for the full spectrum of operations at an acceptable risk level.

3. Budget Overview

The Air Force strongly supports an appropriations bill, which would provide Congressional response to the strategic choices expressed by the President in the FY11 DoD budget. With current funding restricted to FY10 levels, the Air Force is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to identify sources to fund urgent operational needs in Afghanistan and Iraq, military pay, operations and maintenance costs, and military healthcare. Resourcing these shortfalls may require making major reductions to flying hours, delaying or cancelling some weapons system sustainment and depot maintenance activity, and disrupting other day-to-day operations -- all of which will adversely affect readiness and impact our people serving in harm's way.

The Air Force's FY12 budget request for \$119.0B reflects an extraordinary effort to ensure America gets the maximum value out of every dollar. This request supports OSD's initiatives to reduce excess overhead costs and allocate the savings to force structure, modernization, and readiness. As the future security environment will require a range of agile and flexible capabilities, investments for today's conflict will also support our efforts to prepare, prevent, prevail, and preserve future capability. In FY12 the overall end strength remains relatively constant at 332,800 active duty Airmen reserve component end strength at 71,400 and Air National Guard end strength at 106,700.

Our FY12 \$45.3B operations and maintenance (O&M) budget request supports operations at 80 major installations and funds air, space, and cyber operations, as well as intelligence, logistics, nuclear deterrence, special operations, and search and rescue capabilities.

Efficiency efforts include consolidating four air operations centers into two, eliminating three Numbered Air Forces, reducing fuel and energy consumption, and improving depot and supply-chain business processes to sustain weapons systems. Realization of cost-savings allows the Air Force to reallocate funding to modernize and recapitalize weapons systems, improve capabilities and enhance warfighter operations. Examples include: investing in the Long-Range Strike Family of Systems, including a new penetrating bomber, maximizing production of the MQ-9 Reaper, increasing procurement of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, modernizing F-15 radars, and purchasing more Joint Strike Fighter simulators. The efficiency effort allowed the Air Force to improve readiness by re-focusing to overcome the challenges facing the nation, especially given the fiscal environment.

4. Personnel Readiness

Our dedicated Airmen are the foundation of the Air Force. Recruiting, training, and retaining an all-volunteer force requires significant investment. This investment drives the effectiveness of our highly skilled and technically proficient force. Combatant commander requirements are being supported from both the continental U.S. and overseas bases. Of the 37,000 Airmen forward-deployed worldwide, nearly 30,000 are continuing on a rotating basis to contribute to operations in the CENTCOM AOR-- including 10,000 airmen in Afghanistan providing close air support to U.S. and coalition ground forces, airlift and air refueling, personnel rescue, air medical evacuation training to develop our partner air force, and many other missions.

An additional 57,000 total force Airmen are forward stationed overseas providing capabilities in direct support of our combatant commander requirements. And from home stations here in the United States, approximately 218,000 Airmen provide daily support to

combatant commanders' worldwide operations, including standing nuclear alert, commanding and controlling our satellites, controlling remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), analyzing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data and much more.

However, today's high operations tempo continues to stress 20 of the 132 enlisted specialties and eight of the 125 officer specialties. A number of programs are in place to bolster the manning in these career fields as well as mitigate potential negative effects on our Airmen and their families.

5. Space & Cyberspace Readiness

The Air Force provides the full range of air, space, and cyber capabilities daily to meet combatant commander requirements. The Air Force continues to provide reliable precision navigation and timing, secured satellite communications, missile warning and space situational awareness capabilities.

Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented national security advantages in strategic decision-making, military operations, and homeland security. We plan to achieve greater efficiencies in acquiring space assets by implementing better business practices in satellite and spacelift procurement, establishing more stability in the development process and utilizing block buys in procurement. Spacelift is a critical component of the national security space enterprise. Despite our success, spacelift is still a complex and costly undertaking. Three recent launch studies reached the same conclusion that immediate commitment to a fixed annual production rate for launch vehicles is imperative to sustain the industrial base and control costs. To ensure this commitment, the FY12 budget submission

requests an additional \$3.5B across the FYDP to reach a procurement rate of five DoD launches each year.

The Air Force FY12 budget request includes \$4.6B to sustain and maintain our critical cyberspace capabilities. The Air Force contributes to the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating cyberspace capabilities in three mission areas: support, defense, and offense. Access to cyberspace is increasingly critical to meet Joint and allied requirements for freedom of maneuver in all domains. Air Force networks face a continuous barrage of assaults from state-sponsored actors, terror networks, international criminal organizations, individual hackers, and all level of threats in between.

The 24th Air Force, the Air Force component of U.S. Cyber Command, achieved full operational capability on October 1, 2010. The Air Force is also aligning education and training programs with our operational approach to cyberspace to develop our cyberspace professionals. In December 2010, we graduated our first cadre of cyberspace operators.

In addition, the Air Force increased situational awareness of Air Force networks while securely improving information sharing and transport capabilities. Investments in additional network defenders increase protection of information vital to Joint force operations. In the offensive mission area, formal training programs for both initial and mission qualification provide trained forces to U.S. Cyber Command when tasked. Additionally, as the lead support agency to U.S. Cyber Command, the Air Force is responsible for the construction and installed infrastructure for the new U.S. Cyber Command Integrated Cyber Center at Fort Meade, Maryland.

6. Aircraft Readiness

The dedicated work and professionalism of our Airmen ensures our aircraft inventory is ready despite extensive use in contingency operations and increases in fleet average age. Due to these challenges, modernization and recapitalization of our aircraft remains a very high priority.

The readiness of the Mobility Air Forces remains high while meeting robust and dynamic operational requirements. Our airlift fleet continues to provide strategic airlift as well as theater and direct support airlift missions moving personnel and a wide variety of equipment and supplies. The awarding of the KC-46A contract starts the timeline for recapitalizing our aerial refueling aircraft. The planned acquisition of 179 aircraft will help provide refueling capability for decades to come. We will retire 8 C-5As in FY11 in order to eliminate excess strategic airlift capacity as recommended by the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study-2016. Modernization and enhancement of the workhorse mobility fleet will continue with the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program (RERP), the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), and the C-17 Block 13-17 upgrade program.

The readiness of Combat Air Forces aircraft is adequate despite challenges from accumulating hours on our fleet faster than envisioned when these aircraft were first fielded. During the FY12 program review, the Air Force delivered to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) the Service fighter force position of 1200 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI) and 2000 Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI). Delays in the F-35 program, and decreased funding for F-22 modernization increase reliance on the legacy fighter fleet, driving the need to extend their service life and modernize combat capability. AF actions to extend and modernize the legacy fleet are a bridge to 5th generation capability and are not considered replacement actions. The F-16 Service Life

Extension Program (SLEP) is one example of the effort to mitigate fighter force capacity shortfall. Funding the initial development of a Long Range Strike Family of Systems, including a new penetrating bomber, leveraging proven technologies, and next generation, extended range standoff missiles, allows the Air Force to address anticipated threats. To keep our legacy platforms viable well into the future, the Air Force intends to reestablish itself as a leader in Electronic Warfare through modernization of legacy programs and increased capacity including acceleration of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar modernization programs, electronic protect software upgrades and adding two additional EC-130H Compass Call aircraft authorizations over the FYDP. Lastly, in the past year, the Air Force dramatically increased the capability to collect, process, and disseminate timely multi-intelligence information to the warfighter by delivering 8 remotely piloted aircraft (MQ-1/9) combat air patrols (CAPs) to U.S. CENTCOM. We are on track to expand the number of MQ-1/9 CAPs to 50 CAPs by end of FY11 and 65 CAPs by end of FY13.

7. Nuclear Deterrence

Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the number one Air Force priority, and we have taken positive steps within the FY12 budget request to continue to strengthen and improve this Core Function.

Air Force Global Strike Command achieved full operational capability (FOC) on September 30, 2010, moving all Air Force nuclear-capable bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) under one command. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center continues to pursue vital and deliberate sustainment of the nuclear enterprise through efforts such as the Air Force Comprehensive Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment process. As for nuclear

force structure, bomber force modernization continued in an effort to maintain a viable force beyond 2030. We have completed the transition to four B-52 operational squadrons with the addition of the 69th Bomb Squadron at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. ICBM modernization and sustainment also continued with investments in new test equipment and launch facility environmental control systems.

The Air Force has completed a number of assessments to address systemic issues with ICBM infrastructure and operating procedures as well as a report on the age and pedigree of the infrastructure and equipment associated with the ICBM system. Based on these assessments, it is clear that a significant portion of the existing infrastructure will eventually require modernization or complete replacement in the years ahead.

The Air Force budget request of \$5.2B continues to invest in the future of nuclear deterrence. The Air Force is committed to sustaining the ICBM force through 2030 with investment including command and control, cryptographic improvements and ballistic missile fuse sustainment. The budget request also includes other programs such as the tail kit portion of the B61 nuclear weapon life extension program, the future long-range standoff weapon, and the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform that highlight our efforts of strengthening the future of nuclear deterrence. Beyond weapon system sustainment and modernization, the Air Force is focusing on human capital as we carefully balance requirements for our limited, intensively scrutinized, high-demand Airmen in the nuclear enterprise.

The Air Force is prepared for a new verification regime and is planning for the elimination and conversion of launchers under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We will work with the OSD and U.S. Strategic Command to identify and assess options for future force structure adjustments consistent with the Treaty provisions.

7. Conclusion

Air Force personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and organizations are prepared for today's operations and tomorrow's uncertain challenges, despite fiscal challenges and high operations tempo. With an uncompromising commitment to our core values of integrity, service before self and excellence in all we do, the Air Force remains ready to provide global vigilance, reach and power for America.



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HERBERT J. "HAWK" CARLISLE

Lt. Gen. Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for formulating policy supporting air, space, irregular warfare, counterproliferation, homeland security, weather and cyber operations. As the Air Force Operations Deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Carlisle determines operational requirements, capabilities and training necessary to support national security objectives and military strategy.



General Carlisle graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1978. He has served in various operational and staff assignments throughout the Air Force and commanded a fighter squadron, an operations group, two wings and a numbered air force. The general is a joint service officer and served as the Chief of Air Operations, U.S. Central Command Forward in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. During that time he participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He also participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey as Commander of the 54th Fighter Squadron, and Operation Noble Eagle as the 33rd Fighter Wing Commander. General Carlisle served on the Air Staff as Director, Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, and twice in the Plans and Programs Directorate. He also served as the Deputy Director, and later, Director of Legislative Liaison at the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Prior to his current assignment, General Carlisle was the Commander, 13th Air Force, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

The general is a command pilot with more than 3,600 flying hours in the AT-38, YF-110, YF-113, T-38, F-15A/B/C/D, and C-17A.

EDUCATION

1978 Bachelor of Science degree in math, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1982 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1984 F-15 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
 1988 Master's degree in business administration, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, Calif.
 1991 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1993 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
 1997 Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
 2002 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, N.Y.

2005 Seminar XXI - International Relations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
 2007 Executive Course on National and International Security, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. May 1978 - November 1979, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. November 1979 - January 1984, instructor pilot and flight examiner, 525th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bitburg Air Base, West Germany
3. January 1984 - January 1986, Chief of Weapons and Tactics, 9th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Holloman AFB, N.M.
4. January 1986 - April 1988, Chief of Weapons and Tactics and flight commander, 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev.
5. April 1988 - July 1990, Director, F-15 Multistage Improvement Program, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis AFB, Nev.
6. July 1990 - June 1991, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
7. June 1991 - July 1993, Chief of Air Operations-Forward Element, Joint Operations Directorate, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
8. July 1993 - June 1995, operations officer, 19th Fighter Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
9. June 1995 - July 1996, Commander, 54th Fighter Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
10. July 1996 - June 1997, student, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
11. June 1997 - June 1998, Deputy Commander, 18th Operations Group, Kadena AB, Japan
12. June 1998 - March 2000, Commander, 1st Operations Group, Langley AFB, Va.
13. March 2000 - February 2001, Chief, Combat Forces Division, Directorate of Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
14. March 2001 - February 2003, Commander, 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, Fla.
15. March 2003 - August 2004, Chief, Program Integration Division, Directorate of Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
16. September 2004 - April 2005, Deputy Director, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.
17. May 2005 - June 2007, Commander, 3rd Wing, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
18. June 2007 - November 2007, Director, Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
19. November 2007 - August 2009, Director, Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. September 2009 - December 2010, Commander, 13th Air Force, Hickam AFB, Hawaii
21. January 2011 - present, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

June 1991 - June 1993, Chief of Air Operations-Forward Element, Joint Operations Directorate, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as a major and lieutenant colonel

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 3,600

Aircraft flown: AT-38, YF-110, YF-113, T-38, F-15A/B/C/D, and C-17A

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

Joint Meritorious Unit Award with oak leaf cluster

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 31, 1978

First Lieutenant May 31, 1980

Captain May 31, 1982

Major March 1, 1989

Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1993

Colonel Sept. 1, 1998

Brigadier General Aug. 1, 2005

Major General Dec. 10, 2007

Lieutenant General Sept. 2, 2009

(Current as of January 2011)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL BRUCE CLINGAN

**DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS
AND STRATEGY**

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

ON

**ARE WE READY? THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET
REQUEST AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO READINESS**

10 MARCH 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of the Committee, it is my honor and pleasure to appear before you. Today, as we have done for more than 235 years, our Navy is forward-deployed around the world protecting our nation. Our dedicated Navy men and women are operating globally at sea, on land, in the air, and in the space and cyberspace domains. I appreciate your continued support for our Sailors, our civilians, and their families.

The Navy remains committed to the vision presented in our Maritime Strategy—*A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*—and developed further in the Naval Operations Concept 2010. Its strategic imperatives and central tenets are enduring and our Navy is exercising daily our six Core Capabilities: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Global trends in an uncertain world underpin an increasing demand for seapower. As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both national security and economic prosperity. The safety and economic interests of the United States, its allies and partners depend upon the unimpeded trade and commerce that traverse the world's oceans. U.S. vital national interests are tied, therefore, to a secure maritime environment, which places global responsibilities on our naval forces.

My role as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy is to advise the Chief of Naval Operations on how we can effectively posture, disperse and deploy naval forces across the globe to conduct an array of steady state activities designed to prevent war, and when required, to effectively respond to crises or prevail in combat operations. Fleet Commanders employ naval forces in daily operational activities that are the ways in which the Sea Services achieve the ends articulated in our Maritime Strategy. Persistently present forward

naval forces are continuously engaged with global partners in cooperative security activities aimed at reducing instability, enhancing maritime security, and providing another element of national diplomacy. Their expeditionary capabilities enable and support joint force efforts to combat both conventional and irregular challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan; in states throughout Africa, and elsewhere throughout the world.

As U.S. ground forces remain engaged in overseas contingency operations, and eventually reconstitute and reset; naval forces will remain the nation's strategic reserve and immediate response force. The sustained presence and engagement of forward stationed and rotational naval forces will take on even greater importance as the future security environment promises to be characterized by multiple, concurrent, diverse challenges that demand immediate responses that cannot always wait for diplomatic access to be negotiated. U.S. seapower allows our nation to maintain presence and influence from the maritime commons, and when necessary, to use the sea as maneuver space to project power when and where it is needed. The Navy also provides our nation multi-purpose capabilities that are inherently flexible and uniquely able to facilitate the integration and application of all elements of national power.

The President's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget submission continues to maintain a Navy that is forward postured and present to prevent conflict, deter aggression, enhance cooperative relationships, build the maritime security capacity of our partners, provide humanitarian assistance, and prevail in combat at and from the sea when necessary.

Again thank you for your unwavering commitment to our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, and for all you do to make our United States Navy an effective and enduring global force for good.

Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5)

Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan is a native of Lafayette, Ind., but was raised in Bellevue, Wash. He graduated from the University of Washington and holds a Masters of Science from the University of Southern California. He received his commission through the NROTC program in June 1977.

Designated a naval aviator in May 1979, Clingan flew F-14 Tomcats with Fighter Squadron 124, Fighter Squadron 114, and Fighter Squadron 211, making deployments aboard USS *America* (CV 66), USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65), USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63), and USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68). He commanded Fighter Squadron 11, and after completing the nuclear power program, served as executive officer of USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72). Subsequently, he commanded the 6th Fleet flagship USS *LaSalle* (AFG 3) and USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70).



Ashore, Clingan served as an F-14 flight instructor at Fighter Squadron 124, where he helped Naval Air Systems Command and Grumman Aerospace Corporation develop the F-14D Super Tomcat as a member of the Aircrew Systems Advisory Panel.

Clingan's first Joint assignment was in Europe, as a member of the Operations and Readiness Branch, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, where he helped negotiate various North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Spanish Coordination Agreements.

After selection to flag rank, Clingan joined United States Central Command, serving as deputy director of Operations from April 2002 to May 2004 during Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*. Clingan assumed command of Carrier Strike Group 3 / *Carl Vinson* Strike Group in June 2004 and served as CTF-50/152 during an extended deployment in support of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in 2005. Subsequently, he joined the staff of the chief of Naval Operations in September 2005 as deputy director, Air Warfare Division (N78B), followed by assignments as director, Air Warfare Division (N88) and director, Warfare Integration/Senior National Representative (N8F). Following his tour on chief of Naval Operations staff, he assumed command of Joint Command Lisbon; commander, U.S. 6th Fleet; commander, Allied Joint Command Lisbon; commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO; deputy commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; deputy commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa; and Joint Forces Maritime Component commander, Europe.

Clingan began his current tour of duty in December 2009 as deputy chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5).

Clingan's personal decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (four awards), the Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards) and various service and campaign awards.

2011 DC PPO Written Readiness Statement to the HASC(R) (Draft)
10 Mar 11

STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD T. TRYON
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

10 March 2011

2011 DC PPO Written Readiness Statement to the HASC(R) (Draft)

10 Mar 11

Introduction

The United States Marine Corps is America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. After nearly a decade of constant combat and counter-insurgency operations, the performance of the Marine Corps remains unparalleled and reflects the accomplishments and the sacrifices of your Marines and their families.

The pace of operations for the Marine Corps remains high, with approximately 31,000 Marines forward-deployed across the globe. There are approximately 22,400 Marines deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation NEW DAWN. Pre-deployment training programs ensure combat formations, as well as the individual Marine, consistently deploy as the best-trained and most ready force to meet global combatant commander operational requirements. The OEF Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is trained, resourced, and ready to accomplish its assigned mission. Deploying and deployed units report the highest levels of readiness for their assigned missions. The Marine Corps can sustain this commitment under current conditions for as long as the Nation requires, acknowledging such a commitment comes at a cost to the readiness of its non-deployed forces.

Nature of the Current Fight

Today's Marines are highly trained and combat proven across the range of military operations. Marine units in Afghanistan operate in a rapidly evolving, highly complex environment against a very adaptive, resourceful enemy. Depending upon the population density of a given area, infantry battalions are responsible for anywhere from 50 square miles of urban and rural terrain to upwards of 500 square miles. Within this battlespace, Marine units work to defeat the insurgency along multiple lines of operation which include security, governance, rule of law, and economic development. These multiple, mutually supporting lines of operation and the distributed nature of the conflict are what have required the Marine Corps to augment forward-deployed units with additional equipment and personnel from non-deployed forces and strategic programs.

The posture of the force must be viewed from two perspectives: the ability to meet and sustain known operations; and the ability to respond to new requirements with the non-deployed force. Non-deployed units are in a constant cycle of post-deployment dwell and subsequent training for their next deployment. Sustainment of current operations has reduced the aggregate readiness of the non-deployed force. This increases risk in the timely execution of large-scale contingencies.

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For the past several years, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the Marine Corps to operate primarily in a land-based environment. High operational tempo and the necessary sustained focus on irregular warfare, stability operations, and counterinsurgency in Iraq and now Afghanistan have degraded the Marine Corps's fundamental core competency – its amphibious expertise. Outside the regular training and deployment cycles of the Marine Expeditionary Units, training opportunities for amphibious operations have been limited due to supporting operations in OEF and the limited availability of amphibious platforms. Accordingly, training shortfalls in amphibious and prepositioning operations affect the Marine Corps's ability to respond to other operational plans, contingencies, and activities.

Readiness Assessment

The Marine Corps' top readiness concern is its ability to simultaneously sustain current operations in Afghanistan and to respond, rapidly, with a cohesive force to an additional large-scale contingency. Unit readiness shortfalls have been the price of sustained combat operations.

- **Personnel:** Units in dwell are heavily leveraged, in terms of leadership and expertise, to meet ongoing operational commitments. Although the operating forces possess experienced leaders, trainers, and planners, a significant number are not available due to sourcing service individual augments, joint individual augments, and Afghan partner mentor teams. While these Marine leaders, planners, and trainers are enhancing the capabilities of Afghan security forces and performing needed functions in forward-deployed joint and Marine headquarters, their extended absence leaves some non-deployed units short of key personnel needed to lead and train Marines. Approximately 35 percent of non-deployed units report key personnel shortfalls.

- **Equipment:** Non-deployed units and strategic programs, such as our pre-positioning programs, have been used to source equipment needs for forward-deployed and deploying units. Reduced equipment sets available to units in dwell present training challenges and an increased risk to immediately responding to major contingencies.

Approximately sixty-eight percent of non-deployed units report degraded readiness in the areas of capabilities and/or resources. Resource shortfalls manifest themselves as capability gaps in individual unit and collective core competencies. The largest contributing factor to unit capability gaps is equipment; approximately sixty-three percent of non-deployed forces report mission essential equipment shortfalls. The reasons for degraded equipment readiness are as follows:

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- The strategic shift from Iraq to Afghanistan required the Marine Corps to hold equipment in theater and identify serviceable assets for movement to OEF – equipment the Marine Corps has been unable to reset and return to non-deployed units.
- The difficult operating environment and distributed nature of the battlespace in Regional Command Southwest are degrading the normal expected service limits of some principle end items (PEIs), dramatically increasing the frequency of preventive maintenance actions. In some cases, the expected service limit of equipment has decreased by up to one-half.
- The Marine Corps has been forced to take mission essential equipment from non-deployed units and strategic programs to help fully equip the deployed and next-to-deploy units. The equipment life expectancy issues mentioned above, as well as battle damage and wear, have necessitated the establishment of a robust forward-in-stores capability and a major equipment rotation program to support deployed forces. This further strains the equipment available to non-deployed forces.
- Many Marine units are, by design, force providers for regimental combat teams and Marine Air Ground Task Forces. If these units were required for a contingency or other operation, the Marine Corps would globally source and organize them into fully capable units prior to their deployment. Due to the commitment of forces in support of OEF, the time required to task organize for a contingency deployment would likely be extended.

Reset and Reconstitution

Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have placed an unprecedented demand on ground weapons systems, aviation assets, vehicles, and support equipment. This equipment has experienced accelerated “wear and tear” due to many years of sustained combat operations in exceedingly harsh operating environments. In many cases, the result is that peacetime equipment usage rates have been far exceeded, or items have been destroyed or damaged beyond economical repair as a result of combat operations. Congress’s continued support is needed to reset and reconstitute Marine ground and aviation assets to meet combatant commander requirements and posture the Marine Corps for the future security environment. This will require a multi-year support effort beyond the conclusion of combat operations.

The Commandant has directed that the Marine Corps will reconstitute to a “middleweight force” ideally positioned between special operations and heavy forces, able to rapidly shift across the range of military operations. This will enable it to operate throughout the spectrum of threats – irregular, hybrid, and conventional – or the areas where they overlap. The Marine Corps is currently in the

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midst of a comprehensive reconstitution planning effort to fulfill the Commandant's vision, post-conflict. Building upon its strong traditional foundation and incorporating modern lessons learned, the Marine Corps is confident it will continue to uphold its legacy of being ready and able to immediately respond to the Nation's demands.

Conclusion

As Marines continue to serve in combat, the United States Marine Corps remains the Nation's crisis response force. The Marine Corps needs the sustained support of the American people and Congress to maintain readiness, to reset and reconstitute the force during an extended war, and to modernize to adapt to the future security environment. The Corps is grateful for the support Congress has provided to date and we are mindful of the fiscal realities confronting our nation. We are committed to being responsible stewards of scarce public funds just as are dedicated to serve the nation with honor, courage and commitment as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness.



Lieutenant General Richard T. Tryon

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations

Lieutenant General Tryon enlisted in the Navy in 1970 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 1975 upon graduating from the Naval Academy.

Following The Basic School, he held various assignments in 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, served as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General I MAF/1st Marine Division, and completed a tour as the Headquarters Company Commander, 4th Marines in Okinawa in 1980.

After a tour at Recruiting Station New York, he attended Amphibious Warfare School in 1983. He then joined 2d Battalion, 5th Marines where he served as company commander and operations officer. He attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1987, concurrently earning a Masters Degree in Management from Webster University.



In 1988, he transferred to the Special Operations Command, Europe. He deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM serving with the Joint Special Operations Task Force, JTF Proven Force. Following Desert Storm, he deployed with Joint Special Operations Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT operating in Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey.

In 1991, he reported to the Special Operations Training Group, II MEF as director of the Special Missions Branch. From 1993 to 1995, he commanded 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. He was then assigned to the Pentagon as Deputy Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1997. He attended The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and received a Master of Arts Degree in International Public Policy in 1998.

Lieutenant General Tryon served as Commanding Officer, 24th MEU (SOC) from 1998 to 2000 and as Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Washington D.C. from 2000 until 2002. From 2002 until 2004, he served as Executive Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe/Commander, U.S. European Command.

In 2004, he was assigned as Commanding General of Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island and the Eastern Recruiting Region and as Commanding General of Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Quantico, Virginia in June 2006.

In June 2008, he assumed command of 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. One month later he further assumed the duties as Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). Upon deployment to Iraq in January 2009, he was designated as the Commanding General, Multinational Force-West. In January 2010, he returned to Camp Lejeune relinquishing command of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) in February 2010 and 2d Marine Division in July 2010. Lieutenant General Tryon assumed duties as Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations in October 2010.

Lieutenant General Tryon's personal decorations include: Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; the Legion of Merit with gold star; the Defense Meritorious Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal with gold star; the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.

Lieutenant General Tryon and his wife Diane have four children: Kristen, Kathryn, Jay, and Kelly, and five grandchildren: Matthew, Nicholas, Mary Kate, Garrett, and Caitlin.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 10, 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

24 Mar 11

INFORMATION PAPER

Subj: DC, PP&O HASC-R QUESTION FOR THE RECORD (QFR) REGARDING THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE

1. Purpose. To provide a response to the QFR posed by Representative J. Randy Forbes, Chairman of the HASC-Readiness Subcommittee, during DC PPO's testimony on 10 Mar 11.
2. BLUF. The Chairman asked DC, PP&O questions about the capability of a CONUS-based MPSRON to activate and respond to a crisis/contingency if the ships were not loaded with equipment and ammunition.
3. Discussion.

The questions posed by the Chairman included the following:

- Question #1: If we did not have the equipment stocks prepositioned and we had the MPSRON back in homeport, is there a difference in the response time between a forward-deployed, fully-loaded MPSRON and a CONUS-based empty MPSRON? In other words, how much time does it take to assemble the stocks that you would need on those vessels before they could move forward?

- Answer #1: It would take approximately 36 to 42 days to load a completely empty five-ship MPSRON with its full complement of equipment and ammunition and prepare it to sail from Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, Florida.
Factors:

- The port infrastructure at Blount Island Command will only support loading one MPS ship at a time. It would take approximately 36-42 days to fully load a five-ship MPSRON.
- If the equipment were readily available, it would take approximately 5-7 days to load a single ship with its full complement of equipment; however, it is the effort necessary to aggregate, transport, and load the full complement of ammunition that consumes the greatest amount of time.
- Approximately 18 million pounds of ammunition in 600 tractor-trailer trucks would arrive at Blount Island Command in Florida from ammunition supply points in Utah, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky.
- Transportation time, safety concerns due to the net explosive weight of the ammunition, and the sequencing of port operations to load equipment and ammunition all contribute to the amount of time it would take to ready an empty CONUS-based MPSRON for sail.
- It is important to note that a Reduced Operating Status (ROS) MPSRON would have its equipment loaded aboard the ships. The MPSRON's ammunition would still take from 36 to 42 days to aggregate, transport, and load.

- Question #2: How long would it take, in days, for that same MPSRON to sail to a designated port to support contingency response in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Pacific?

- Answer #2: CONUS-based and forward-deployed MPSRON response timelines are provided below, per information from Military Sealift Command. A 16-knot speed of advance was assumed for all calculations.

UNCLASSIFIED

Subj: USMC PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE COLD RESPONSE 2012 (CR12)

Empty, CONUS-based MPSRON from:

	<u>Persian Gulf</u> (days)	<u>Korea</u> (days)	<u>Lebanon</u> (days)
Jacksonville, FL	24 via Suez	26 via Panama	15
	<u>+36-42 to load</u>	<u>+36-42 to load</u>	<u>+36-42 to load</u>
	60-66 days	62-68 days	51-57 days

Loaded, forward-deployed ships from:

	<u>Persian Gulf</u> (days)	<u>Korea</u> (days)	<u>Lebanon</u> (days)
Trondheim, Norway	20 via Suez	31 via Suez	11
Mediterranean	14 via Suez	26 via Suez	6
Diego Garcia	7	13	11 via Suez
Guam/Saipan	17	4.5	21.5 via Suez
Arifjan	0	18	10 via Suez

- Question #3: Without a ready, available, and forward-deployed MPSRON, please articulate the risk to timely crisis response.

- Answer #3: The loss of a forward-deployed MPSRON degrades the Marine Corps' ability to provide a timely crisis response capability and flexibility across the full range of military operations. Per the SECDEF-approved decision to place MPSRON-1 from the Mediterranean into a reduced operating status in FY13, EUCOM and AFRICOM are the most affected. Placing an MPSRON into a reduced operating status will also affect theater security cooperation requirements, which in the past have been supported by MPF equipment.

4. Recommendation. None. For information only.



UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

APR 15 2011

The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Representative Smith:

Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment on the Army's Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) unfunded requirements. Your interest in our Soldiers and their mission is greatly appreciated.

The Army remains committed to providing the best land force possible to defend the Nation and our worldwide interests, and the best work and living environments possible for our Soldiers and their Families. As submitted, the FY12 President's Budget keeps the Army on track to sustain the all-volunteer force, to adjust our global posture in line with the country's strategic requirements, and to provide our Soldiers with the most effective equipment and training available. We also will continue our progress in modernizing the force and developing new technologies to meet future threats.

The FY12 President's Budget request reflects funding for the highest priorities of the Army. As such, the Army will not present any unfunded requirements and the Secretary and I will endeavor to fund all Army requirements with whatever funding the Congress sees fit to appropriate. As we execute FY12 programs and funding, there may be fact of life changes that we will ask for your support to mitigate.

On behalf of the Army's Soldiers, their Families, and our civilians, I would like to thank you again for your personal dedication to the U.S. military. The Congress' and your efforts are essential to our success and are deeply valued. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Martin E. Dempsey".

Martin E. Dempsey
General, United States Army

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 10, 2011

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Admiral CLINGAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
[See page 39.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

General CARLISLE. No facility changes are anticipated in order to implement the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Therefore, there are no expected costs. [See page 27.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 10, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. General Casey said at last week's posture hearing that the Army's rotational force model allowed them to hedge against unexpected contingencies. Is this a reasonable assessment of the state of the force? Can the Army rapidly respond to an unplanned event—or several should they occur simultaneously? How much strategic risk are we accepting with these rotational force models that provide “just-in-time” readiness?

General BOLGER. The Army's rotational force generation model is designed to provide strategic flexibility and depth to meet unexpected contingencies. The high demand for forces over the past nine years consumed the readiness of forces as quickly as it was generated and caused the Army to accumulate additional risk due to limited strategic depth. Restoring balance to the Army is the critical first step to reduce strategic risk. The Army's plan includes a decrease in the global demands for forces, full implementation of our force generation model (including favorable deployment to dwell ratios), and assured access to the Reserve Component. The Army rapidly responds to unplanned events through the use of its Surge Force. If there are several events, the Army will utilize the Surge Force that is trained/ready for contingency missions. The Army has low level strategic risk with our supply based force generation model because it generates progressive readiness across the Total Force.

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of threats described by the witnesses at last week's hearing? If not, what should we be doing?

General BOLGER. The Army remains a resilient, professional, and combat-seasoned force. However, operational demands continue to strain our Soldiers, Civilians, Families, equipment, and infrastructure. Deployment-to-dwell ratios remain high, putting stress on the All-Volunteer Force and hampering the Army's ability to train for full spectrum operations. The Army's plan to reduce this risk to the force is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios over the long-term, maintaining assured access to the Reserve Component, adequately providing for Soldiers, Civilians, and Families, and receiving reliable, timely, and consistent funding.

To ensure we are ready and to restore strategic depth to the Army, our leadership is working to establish manageable deploy-to-dwell ratios. This will not only provide adequate time for Soldiers to recover and equipment to be repaired, but also provide the time to conduct full spectrum training so we are prepared for the range of missions mentioned last week. Maintaining access to the Reserve Component will assist us in achieving favorable deploy-to-dwell ratios and bring skill sets and experience essential to be successful in these complex environments.

With the demands placed on Soldiers and Families, we must also take care to ensure we provide them a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their sacrifice. Providing adequate reintegration time and assistance, ensuring they have a high quality of life on Army installations, and meeting other health and family needs will be essential in sustaining an All-Volunteer Force by having Soldiers and Families continue to choose to stay Army.

Effective repair and replacement of equipment after a deployment is also vital to maintaining readiness. Currently, the Army spends approximately \$11 billion each fiscal year on procurement and maintenance actions for reset of a redeploying force of approximately 150,000 Soldiers and their equipment. Because of the large reset requirement driven by wartime demands, the pace with which equipment can be retrograded and repaired, and the critical need to reconstitute our prepositioned stocks of equipment, the Army will continue to require supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for reset for 2 to 3 years upon completion of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These measures will help ensure we are ready by completing the rebalancing of our Army and restoring strategic depth and capacity necessary to provide a sustainable flow of trained and ready forces for these missions at a tempo that is sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the Army's Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications

to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the witnesses described in the hearing last week?

General BOLGER. The rotational model allows the Army to generate readiness to meet both current demands and unforeseen contingencies. The Mission Force consists of available pool units that satisfy current combatant command demands such as Operations New Dawn, Enduring Freedom, Global Response Force, and theater posture on the Korean peninsula. In steady-state, the generated will be sufficient to satisfy Department of Defense's projected needs. The Surge Force consists of selected units at high readiness levels that are available to respond to unforeseen threats. The Surge Forces are sized to meet Army requirements for the early phases of the Department of Defense's operational contingency plans, an additional small scale contingency, and homeland security event; additional strategic forces will flow for later phases.

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a "temporary fix" to the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies?

General BOLGER. The Army has no equities. This is best addressed by the United States Navy and the United States Air Force.

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10?

General BOLGER. This question is perhaps better suited for the Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy or Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. However, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) considered the 20-year timeframe directed in legislation, but focused the bulk of its efforts about 5–10 years in the future where the DoD can begin to make a difference now with near-term investment decisions. As recent events have demonstrated, our ability to clearly and precisely foresee challenges to our national security is spotty, at best. The Secretary of Defense recently commented that our ability to predict the future is perfect—perfectly wrong. So it would make sense for us to explore and consider what challenges and opportunities could arise over the 20-year timeframe of a QDR, but focus the bulk of our rigorous analysis and professional judgment on near-term and mid-term issues. A good amount of our Research and Development investments, including Science and Technology, should be focused on developing new capabilities to preserve our competitive advantage in all domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace) throughout the 20-year QDR timeframe.

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion?

General BOLGER. Over the past several years, operational demands have exceeded the Army's sustainable supply of forces, which has challenged the Army's ability to maintain readiness for multiple additional contingencies. These current operational demands have included Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom and other requirements such as deterrence posture on the Korean peninsula and the Global Response Force. As demand approaches a more sustainable level, the Army will build increased capacity to respond to additional contingencies. The Army's rotational model accommodates this increased capacity through a Surge Force consisting of units in training at elevated readiness levels. Another factor that will increase the Army's ability to respond to additional unforeseen contingencies is longer unit dwell times. Longer dwell times enable units to train for the full spectrum of operations rather than focusing on specific missions such as counterinsurgency.

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we've already paid for?

General BOLGER. The Army has a very structured process to estimate life cycle costs to ensure program requirements and resources are identified to operate and maintain equipment. These costs are continually revisited during program execution

and reviews and actions are taken to address operation and maintenance costs and requirements. These requirements are then reflected in our annual budget submissions. Our fleet management strategy/modernization plans consider the viability of our fleets in terms of capabilities and conditions and result in the proper repair or modernization strategies to support readiness requirements, fleet reliability and costs. Additionally, some programs like Condition Based Maintenance + provide significant enablers (sensors on equipment and condition reporting) to identify maintenance conditions and requirements that reduce costs while improving fleet availability and readiness.

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD's role in investing in alternative sources of energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and do you believe the DoD is doing enough?

General BOLGER. Mr. Chairman, the Army's role in the development of alternative energy must be done with the goal of building a robust energy portfolio that assures its ability to perform missions around the globe. Energy plays an important role in command and control, mobility, endurance, resilience and protection capabilities for Army forces conducting the range of military operations in often remote locations worldwide. Likewise, energy is critical to supporting operations such as space, intelligence, information and communications, often in more developed but nevertheless vulnerable locations, both at home and abroad. In order to ensure that it is able to meet mission requirements now and into the future, the Army must pursue alternative energy sources, particularly those that can be generated locally or regionally to deployed forces. In addition, the Army must pursue research, development and fielding of associated technologies such as storage and intelligent control/distribution to strengthen its secure energy portfolio. Decisions on development of specific technologies, and system designs, by the Army must take into account factors of mission and operating environment.

Historically, the Army's pursuit of mission-related capabilities has produced technologies that prove useful for broader applications, both Government and civilian. Various sensors, communications systems and unmanned vehicles are simple but salient examples. Military demand also may support industry capability growth to produce better or more cost-effective materials or technologies—again benefitting American society. In fact, given the growing awareness of energy and water as important factors impacting our economy and domestic security, these additional benefits could prove significant. However, the Army must focus on military capabilities and readiness to guide its investments in energy capabilities. While the Army has made important strides to reduce its energy footprint, more must and will be done.

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last two decades. And in these current economic times, we can't afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military?

General BOLGER. The Army is aggressively pursuing initiatives to better and more prudently manage its acquisition process and resources. The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff commissioned an unprecedented blue ribbon review last May of the Army's acquisition system—a cradle to grave assessment. The Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February 2011. It included 76 recommendations in four broad areas that extend across various Army organizations. Those broad areas address requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) to assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the report which are judged to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's Acquisition process.

However, the Army leadership did not stop there. To ensure that we purchased the right equipment to meet the needs of our Soldiers, the Army instituted a series of capability portfolio reviews to examine all existing Army requirements and terminate programs that we judged to be redundant, did not work or were just too expensive. These broad based reviews have already helped the Army identify key gaps and unnecessary redundancies while promoting good stewardship of our nation's resources. We remain committed to using every effort to obtain the right systems, supplies and services at the right time and at the most cost-effective, streamlined manner.

Mr. FORBES. Are there other "out-of-the-box" ideas we should be considering in order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial time?

General BOLGER. The Army is implementing two innovative initiatives that are intended to increase overall force readiness without spending more money. The first initiative aims to decrease non-deployables in the four highest categories (legal, medical, Theater Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) and separations). The second initiative implements policy and procedural changes the Army has developed to increase personnel stability in units as they move through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. These changes help to improve the timing of assignments, reassignments, separations, and extensions to limit any negative impact on unit readiness.

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% "savings" was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary's "efficiencies initiative" are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are there areas where functions that were identified for "insourcing" last year are now unfunded due to the "efficiencies initiative"? If so, how much risk is associated with these functions or positions being unfunded?

General BOLGER. There are 5,391 un-funded civilian positions which were previously scheduled for in-sourcing. Several Army Commands have notified Headquarters Department of the Army of a potential for mission risk if these positions are not filled. Headquarters Department of the Army is evaluating these risks for Secretary of the Army decision. The Secretary of the Army has already approved 30 positions in Army Cyber Command for in-sourcing due to mission risk.

Mr. FORBES. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR's like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR.

General BOLGER. The Army has begun to rebalance its Military Intelligence Force to institutionalize and enhance core intelligence capabilities, invest these capabilities where "risk-to-force" is greatest and generate sufficient capacity to sustain mission-essential support to committed forces through the Army Force Generation process. This is in response to the Secretary of Defense's emphasis to rebalance Defense programs to institutionalize and enhance current warfighting capabilities as well as prepare for future risks and contingencies. The Army's Military Intelligence Rebalance Strategy will provide greater core intelligence capability at the Brigade Combat Teams and Division/Corps to mitigate intelligence capability gaps. This strategy will inherently improve the Army Intelligence capability for Army units supporting the Pacific theater as well as improve Army Intelligence support to units deploying in support of other world-wide contingencies.

The Army has not decreased Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) as a result of Army ISR support to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The command and control of Army ISR and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) assets reside within the Combatant Commands. As a result, any cross leveling of ISR and PED assets require concurrence from both the Combatant Commands and Joint Forces Command. In addition, modifications to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan would require Secretary of Defense approval. These structural measures have allowed the Army to maintain its ISR support at a steady state to PACOM.

The number of Army ISR missions in support of PACOM has remained relatively unchanged. The minimal changes that have occurred were mission related in nature and not a result of divesting assets in support of other Combatant Commands. In addition, the United States Army Pacific Command's (USARPAC) ISR PED capacity remains unchanged. USARPAC has been able to provide PED support to the other Combatant Commands on an ad hoc basis, when capacity permits and at the discretion of PACOM. We will continue to support CENTCOM ISR requirements without any detriment to PACOM or the other Combatant Commands. With the exception of a minimum amount of ISR training assets in CONUS to support force generation requirements, all Army ISR assets are dedicated in support of the Combatant Commands.

Mr. FORBES. The FY12 budget request is short of your requirement for depot maintenance by more than 16%. What are the risks to readiness,—both in the near

term and in the long term—of this request as the Air Force continues to sustain what was described as a “geriatric” fleet by Ms. Eaglen in last week’s testimony?

General CARLISLE. Although we took risk in weapon systems support by initially funding it at 80 percent, we identified efficiencies that improved funding to 85 percent. Additionally, we are managing near term risk and maintaining our warfighting readiness through balanced support to our legacy fleet and new aircraft. The 16 percent in unfunded requirement risk includes software, sustaining engineering and technical orders; however, this is mitigated through enterprise-wide prioritization to fund the highest priority systems in the year of execution while ensuring a stable depot workload and workforce are maintained. The long-term depot maintenance risk is mitigated through Full Scale Fatigue Testing and Structural Integrity and Service Life Extension Programs which will improve the sustainability of legacy aircraft and ensure total force readiness.

Mr. FORBES. There is little detail in the FY12 budget to inform Congress as to how the Air Force plans to sustain the nuclear enterprise and to correct the deficiencies of the past. Can you please tell us what your plan is in FY12 to ensure that the corrective actions that have been taken over the past two years are sufficiently resourced?

General CARLISLE. A concerted Air Force focused on reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise resulted in significant structure, process and cultural change. This focus has revitalized critical aspects of the nuclear enterprise resulting in renewed visibility and stringent adherence to established nuclear standards, additional personnel to recapitalize the nuclear workforce and increased funding to sustain legacy systems and infrastructure. In FY12, the Air Force plans to continue critical deterrence initiatives including: the future of Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD), the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP), the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) Follow-on, and the F-35A Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability. Additionally, the Air Force is initiating the new Penetrating Bomber program in FY12. For GBSD, the Air Force is planning to internally source funds to develop initial pre-AoA concept characterization and technical descriptions. For CVLSP, the Air Force will pursue a full and open competition with projected contract award in late FY12. Also, the Air Force is analyzing an ALCM Follow-on per Nuclear Posture Review guidance and OSD direction. The ALCM Follow-on AoA is planned to be complete in FY12. In addition, development efforts for a nuclear capable Penetrating Bomber will begin in FY12. F-35A DCA integration efforts with the B61-12 are planned to support Extended Deterrence. Lastly, Air Force modernization efforts to sustain legacy systems including the current ALCM, the current bomber fleet and the Minuteman III ICBM will continue in FY12. For the current ALCM, multiple service life extension programs will continue to ensure viability through 2030. The current bomber fleet and Minuteman III ICBM will be sustained through ongoing and future modernization programs. These efforts will help ensure that the corrective actions taken over the past two years are sufficiently resourced.

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we be doing?

General CARLISLE. The Air Force is ready to counter current threats to our national interests and committed to meeting future readiness challenges. Our long-term readiness concerns focus on aging equipment and weapon systems, and the current high operations tempo for our people.

Overseas Contingency Operations have posed constant personnel and platform challenges since late 2001. In response, we have modified our personnel deployment construct to better support the Combatant Commanders while better managing our people, especially those with high demand/limited supply skill sets.

We have balanced and rebalanced our resources—personnel, weapons systems, training, and equipment—to remain ready to execute today’s operations and foster the flexibility required to meet the uncertain requirements of tomorrow. It will take constant diligence and the support of our national leaders to maintain this balance in a world of increasing technology and lethality.

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the witnesses described in the hearing last week?

General CARLISLE. The Air Force funds the entire force to the same readiness level, thereby eliminating tiered readiness and minimizing any strategic implications. Similar to the Army’s Force Generation Model, the Air Force’s force generation construct is the Air & Space Expeditionary Force, or AEF. As part of the AEF battle rhythm, Air Force capabilities enter a “normal training and exercises” phase

from the period immediately following deployment up to the next predeployment spin-up time. Included in this phase is a brief period of reconstitution to regain mission-ready status following deployments. Additionally, the Air Force typically deploys its forces as task-organized capabilities thereby mitigating lengthy reconstitution times.

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a “temporary fix” to the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies?

General CARLISLE. Providing airmen to support the joint fights in Iraq and Afghanistan has had no measurable impact on Air Force operational readiness. The AF continues to support ground forces in the CENTCOM AOR with Joint Expeditionary Taskings (JET) and support deployed AF headquarters functions with Individual Augmentees (IA). The AF has followed a policy of providing personnel for these JET and IA taskings from within our institutional forces (non-operational staffs) to reduce impacts on Air Force operational units. All personnel assigned to JET or IA taskings are fully qualified for their assigned mission prior to deployment.

JET and IA taskings have trended downward over the past four years, in line with the levels of combat forces in CENTCOM. The Air Force currently has 7,954 personnel deployed to the region, down from 9,273 in 2010 and 12,896 in 2009. In 2008 and 2007 the totals were 13,338 and 13,752, respectively.

The DoD and AF continue to balance the demands of Iraq, Afghanistan and other contingencies such as Japan humanitarian relief and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Libya) with preparations for future conflicts. Recent operations have tested the capacity and resolve of our armed forces, but our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines continue to adapt and meet the demands placed upon them.

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10?

General CARLISLE. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review set the course for the Department of Defense for the next 20 years through its articulation of a strategy and investment to further its rebalancing and reform efforts. The 2010 QDR Report addresses readiness requirements in several respects. For example, the report discusses the importance of having continued access to land, air, and sea training ranges and operating areas that are needed to maintain DoD’s operational readiness. In his portion of the report, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff articulated the requirements associated with Joint force readiness across the full range of military operations. Specifically, he identified the need for investment in critical enablers (such as Special Operations Forces) where shortages have persisted, and for investment in expanded electronic warfare and other capabilities. He also highlighted resetting the force and replacing prepositioned stocks as two crucial readiness requirements. The Chairman estimated that full restoration (replacement and repair of equipment lost in combat and degraded by wear and tear) would take years after OIF and OEF are completed.

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion?

General CARLISLE. Yes, the AF is ready to respond to multiple near-simultaneous contingencies—in fact, we are doing it now. We must recognize, however, that the compounding effects of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and unplanned contingencies such as Japan humanitarian relief and Libya, will make it increasingly difficult. Recapitalization of combat losses, repair and replenishment of equipment, and targeted capability upgrades are still required to maintain the levels of readiness our nation demands.

In the context of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our data shows that the USAF has experienced decreasing readiness since 2001 due to aging aircraft and high operations tempo. Nonetheless, we have been able to match resources with readiness requirements to support Combatant Commander needs and conduct combat operations.

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we've already paid for?

General CARLISLE. The Air Force shares your concern about the affordability of operating and maintaining our weapon systems. We continue to identify efficiencies and cost reduction initiatives to reduce total ownership cost. For example, the Air Force conducts Business Case Analyses to determine the most affordable sustainment approach for many of our weapon systems. Implementation can require upfront investment that will ultimately result in overall cost reduction. Your funding support for these investments as well as funding for tech data and sustaining engineering studies (where warranted) will drive more affordable sustainment for our Air Force programs.

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD's role in investing in alternative sources of energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and do you believe the DoD is doing enough?

General CARLISLE. From the Air Force perspective, it is of vital importance to have the energy available necessary to accomplish our global mission to fly fight and win in air, space, and cyberspace, and we are working to further advance our energy security posture. For the Air Force, energy security means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. This includes ensuring critical assets have the power to operate in the event of a natural disaster or attack, and improving our energy security posture by providing domestic alternatives to foreign oil.

Although not without challenges, alternative sources of energy and fuels present opportunities for the Air Force to increase its supply of energy and improve its energy security posture. The Air Force must consider all sources of energy, renewable, alternative and even traditional fossil fuels to improve our energy security and expand our energy portfolio. This includes evaluating all sources. However, the Air Force will generally be a consumer, and not a producer, of energy and fuel.

We are in the process of certifying our aircraft to fly on synthetic and bio-based fuels blended with traditional JP-8. The certification process expands the types of fuel our aircraft can use. Once the commercial market is ready, having the ability to use non-traditional aviation fuels provides us with an improved energy security posture and increased protection from price fluctuations resulting from foreign oil sources. The Air Force is continuing to review and evaluate potential alternative aviation fuel candidates beyond the synthetic and biofuel-based fuel blends.

Regarding renewable energy for our facilities, we recognize that there is not a "one size fits all" solution and that the economics will dictate our approach. However, we are open to consider long-term business arrangements with companies who are ready to build, operate, and maintain renewable energy projects to generate electricity, heat, or other positive energy benefits for our air bases. In this regard, we are not viewing nor are we wed to "inside the installation boundary" as the only option.

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last two decades. And in these current economic times, we can't afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military?

General CARLISLE. Yes, we agree. The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force recognized the importance of Recapturing Acquisition Excellence (Air Force Strategic Plan—Priority 5) and implemented the Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP). A combination of the AIP's 33 completed improvement actions resulted in a stronger workforce, clearly defined requirements, incremental development strategies, predictable schedules and budgetary needs; all directed at improving the ability to provide industry with clear and concise requests for proposal enabling better buying power for the Air Force.

Specifically, two AIP initiative areas "Improve Requirements Generation Process" and "Instill Budget and Financial Discipline" made significant improvements to help the Air Force "Recapture Acquisition Excellence". On the AIP Initiative 2, "Improve Requirements Generation Process" requires the Service Acquisition Executive, and when applicable, the Air Force Materiel Command Commander or Air Force Space Command Commander, in conjunction with the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council, to attest that the acquisition community can fulfill the Capabilities Development Document requirements. On AIP Initiative 3, "Instill Budget and Financial

Discipline” improves cost estimating process (budgeting programs to a confidence level typically 55–65%), program baseline guidance, and funding stability.

Today, the Air Force continues to implement Dr Carter’s 23 directed “Better Buying Power” initiatives targeted to reducing expenses allocated to overhead and support functions. The Air Force’s goal is to continue improvements to redirect savings to modernization and readiness programs for our warfighters without jeopardizing product delivery.

Mr. FORBES. Are there other “out-of-the-box” ideas we should be considering in order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial time?

General CARLISLE. The United States Air Force continues to assess how to best meet national defense needs. As one way to develop and study “out of the box” ideas we conduct two Title 10 war games to determine what capabilities and force structure USAF should possess in near and far term. Unified Engagement looks at how to better work with partner nations through the full spectrum of conflict 12 to 15 years in the future; while the Future Capabilities Game looks 20 to 25 years into the future to what the broad range of technology will be, and how that may influence and affect the future of the Air Force. These war games provide us the ability to explore and test alternative force structures that better address future challenges, using affordable, technically feasible and operationally balanced platforms across all AF missions. The war game results are used alongside Science and Technology investments to continue to look for “out-of-the-box” ideas to respond to our national defense needs.

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% “savings” was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s “efficiencies initiative” are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are there areas where functions that were identified for “insourcing” last year are now unfunded due to the “efficiencies initiative”? If so, how much risk is associated with these functions or positions being unfunded?

General CARLISLE. The AF is presently conducting a highly focused, strategic review of the entire AF civilian workforce. The goal is to ensure the AF executes this reduction strategically and in a manner that meets all mission requirements while continuing to support our Airmen and their families. The AF will review all Core Functions to balance risk, while satisfying our efficiency targets. While the total AF reduction amount will remain unchanged, the program specific adjustments will be determined by our strategic review and programmed during our FY13 POM submission with our actual execution plan.

All ideas are on the table and the final distribution will be approved by the CSAF and SECAF. Again, the resulting decisions will adjust FY12 and inform the FY13 POM.

Mr. FORBES. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR’s like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR.

General CARLISLE. In addition to currently fielded Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, the Navy is developing complementary capabilities above, on and below the surface of the sea to provide global ISR support to each Combatant Commander, including Pacific Command. Across all three realms Navy is implementing a family of systems approach to employ more sensors and increase time on station. Equipped with plug-and-play sensors utilizing automated processing, these systems will provide focused collection with reduced manpower.

Current airborne ISR aircraft, such as the EP-3 and P-3, continue to deploy in support of PACOM mission requirements. Successful P-3 redstripe recovery efforts will increase the P-3 AIP presence in the PACOM AOR to 12 deployed aircraft in Dec 2011. Development of a new generation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Medium Range Maritime (MRMUAS), and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS)) continues and will provide both land and sea-based capability with greater persistence and area coverage than current platforms. The Navy will deploy Fire Scout on the Littoral Combat Ship as that class comes on line and deploys to

PACOM in the FY13 timeframe. Also, the Navy will establish the first of two BAMS UAS orbits in the PACOM AOR in FY17.

The Navy is also funding additional surface assets that provide critical ISR to fleet assets, including investment in Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System (SURTASS) equipped ships that will support the Pacific theater. Additionally, the Navy continues to develop Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs). UUVs will expand access into areas that are inaccessible or hazardous to manned platforms as well as fill capacity gaps.

Mr. FORBES. Energy has been repeatedly highlighted as an area that could impact future military readiness based on availability of supply. RAND recently published a report regarding alternative fuels. Some of the conclusions suggested that the alternative fuel industry is immature, could not scale up to make an appreciable difference as a domestic alternative, and recommended that DoD not invest in this market.

A. Could you please comment on that report?

B. Can you also provide your opinion whether you believe DoD has a role in the development and procurement of alternative fuels?

Admiral CLINGAN. A. The RAND Corporation study accurately states that the Department of the Navy's switch to biofuels, in and of itself, will not reduce the nation's total energy consumption by a significant margin. However, the RAND Report was not well researched and did not take into account the recent research and development advances in the biofuels technologies. RAND stated in their report that the Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are the most promising near-term options for meeting the Department of Defense's needs cleanly and affordably. Currently, there are no Fischer-Tropsch plants here in the United States. Additionally, under the guidelines of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, Section 526, any replacement fuel has to have a greenhouse gas emission profile less than petroleum. In order to meet this guideline, any Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid plant would have to have carbon capture and sequestration incorporated into this overall process. While there is important carbon capture and sequestration research and development ongoing at DOE, there has not been any carbon capture and sequestration process built to commercial scale in the United States. In summary, due to the EISA 2007, Section 526 guidelines and the cost prohibitive carbon capture and storage process, we feel that the Fischer-Tropsch coal-to-liquid/biomass-to-liquid fuels are not the most promising near-term option for meeting the Department of Defense's needs cleanly and affordably.

While the use of alternative fuels can contribute toward guaranteeing our energy supplies, reducing our operational risks, and during volatile upward price swings in petroleum, could represent additional cost savings, the Department of the Navy's energy strategy has not been limited to alternative fuels. We have aggressively adopted proven energy efficient applications and practices commonly found in the commercial sector. We have funded both science and technology/research and development projects in pursuit of increased energy efficiency since these projects can potentially and directly contribute to the combat capability of our operating forces by reducing our energy consumption both afloat and ashore, and by achieving significant cost savings.

B. The Navy prefers to see itself as an "early adopter" of available biofuels. The military has often led in the development of new technologies where there was a compelling military use, even if the civilian use was ultimately greater (ex. GPS, the Internet). The operational use of alternative fuels by the Department of the Navy will be hastened by collaborating with federal agencies and private industry at every step of the research, development, and certification process. The alternative fuel program establishes the Department of the Navy as an early adopter for investors in a nascent industry that could significantly enhance energy security, and thereby national security, in the mid- to long-term. By positioning itself as an early adopter by testing available biofuels and certifying them "fit for use across our major platforms and leveraging test and certifications accomplished by the other services that meets our specifications", the Navy is better poised to reap the following benefits:

- **Cost savings.** Increasing our use of alternative energy sources helps us achieve a level of protection from energy price volatility. For every \$10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil, the Navy spends an additional \$300 million dollars a year. Operating more efficiently saves money by reducing the amount we spend for fuel. Savings can be reinvested to strengthen combat capability. The cheapest barrel of fuel afloat or kilowatt-hour ashore is the one we do not have to use.
- **Guaranteed Supply.** Our reliance on energy can be exploited by potential adversaries. Efficiency and alternatives may be our best countermeasure. Energy

efficiency increases our mission effectiveness by expanding our range and endurance, and reducing our need for logistics support. Efficiency improvements minimize operational risks of that logistics tether, saving time, money, and lives. Alternative fuels provide the Navy an 'off-ramp from petroleum,' mitigating the risk to a volatile and ever more expensive petroleum market.

- **Fossil Fuel Dependence.** The Navy recognizes that our dependence on fossil fuels and foreign sources of oil makes us more susceptible to price shocks, supply shocks, natural and man-made disasters, and political unrest in countries far from our shores.
- **Combat Capability.** Making our ships and aircraft more efficient improves their fuel economy. We can increase the days between refueling for our ships, improving their security and combat capability. We can also extend the range of our aircraft strike missions, allowing us to launch our aircraft farther away from combat areas. Increasing our efficiency and the diversity in our sources of fuel improves our combat capability strategically and tactically.

Mr. FORBES. There has been significant discussion of energy as an issue that may impact military readiness particularly regarding assured access to oil. The Arctic is said to contain nearly 20% of the world's untapped oil, natural gas, and mineral resources; estimates include over 400 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and gas and mineral deposits worth over \$1 trillion.

- a. While the United States is one of eight Arctic nations with sovereign claims, do you feel it is in our national security interest to be more proactive in this region due to the prospect of oil in this region?
- b. What are the consequences if the nation fails to act?
- c. What is the military's role in this region, and is the DoD prepared?

Admiral CLINGAN. a. Navy's national security responsibilities in the Arctic are similar to those in any other maritime domain. Although the current potential for conflict in the Arctic appears to be low, Navy's core responsibility is to defend the United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its interests abroad. In this regard, the nation's ability to defend its interests and avoid potential crises and conflicts in the Arctic would be significantly enhanced if the United States joined the other seven Arctic littoral states and acceded to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. While sea ice loss is increasing access to energy and mineral deposits in the region, the rate at which these deposits have been extracted has not dramatically increased. Additionally, the Arctic will continue to be ice-covered during the winter months through the next several decades, further complicating resource extraction. Navy is proactively addressing cooperative partnerships in the Arctic to promote safety, stability, and security as detailed in the Navy's Strategic Objectives for the Arctic.

b. Because the U.S. is an Arctic nation and the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, the U.S. Navy has an obligation to be prepared for the changes that are occurring in the region. Failure to prepare for the increasing access to the Arctic will limit our overall ability to respond to security incidents and challenges.

c. Arctic-related security requirements stem from increased human activity in the region that can invite crises over resources, territorial boundaries or excessive claims. While the Navy has operated in the Arctic on a limited basis for decades, we must balance limited resources with ever-expanding global requirements. Navy's Task Force Climate Change is carefully reviewing the right capabilities at the right cost at the right time to meet national requirements for the Arctic, as they potentially represent a considerable commitment of funds during a resource-constrained period.

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of threats described by the witnesses at last week's hearing? If not, what should we be doing?

Admiral CLINGAN. The readiness of the Navy to provide the warfighting resources needed by our Combatant Commanders is a function of capability, capacity and proficiency across the full range of naval missions. Achieving the required levels of each requires a fine balance between acquiring new warfighting capabilities to address emerging threats; modernizing existing capabilities to keep them relevant; sustaining systems and platforms so that they function properly until the end of their expected service life; and training our personnel to guarantee they can employ the systems and platforms effectively in a combat environment. The Navy has succeeded in ensuring our forward deployed forces are prepared to accomplish their planned missions. Additionally, the Navy continues to develop the future capabilities and capacity necessary to support the National Military Strategy in a security environment increasingly characterized by sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)

systems. The Department of Navy in concert with the Department of Air Force, has developed an Air Sea Battle Concept and associated initiatives that outline necessary enhancements across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to address the A2/AD threat. The President's FY12 Budget request addresses these initiatives appropriately in an implementation effort that will span several years.

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the Army's Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the witnesses described in the hearing last week?

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy has been forward deployed since its inception to protect our national interests abroad and to rapidly respond to crises with mission tailored forces. While some forward presence has been provided by units stationed overseas, historically most has been generated by a rotational model from the continental United States. The current model, termed the Fleet Response Plan, is comprised of phases: Maintenance; Training (Basic, Integrated); and Sustainment, during which an overseas deployment typically occurs. Properly resourced and managed, the Fleet Response Plan provides maintenance opportunities to ensure the systems and platforms are effective against extant threats throughout their expected service life; training across the full range of naval operations to ensure personnel can succeed in missions from humanitarian assistance to high-end warfare against a peer rival; 6–7 months of forward deployed time each cycle to support the Combatant Commanders; and a period following deployment when a unit's high readiness is sustained to enable surging forward in response to crises. The President's FY12 Budget request provides sufficient resources to meet the Combatant Commander's most critical requirements and to sustain a relevant Navy into the future.

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a "temporary fix" to the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies?

Admiral CLINGAN. The long-term use of Sailors to meet ground force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan has been necessary to address the evolving needs of the joint force as these conflicts have progressed through various phases. The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and SeaBees, with approximately 5,500 serving in these "core" missions. Navy also provides approximately 4,700 Sailors for provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, customs inspection, and a variety of other "non-core" missions. The joint sourcing process to meet both "core" and "non-core" requirements is deliberate and is currently focused on reducing IA requirements without unduly increasing the risk to mission success.

Navy's FY12 end strength anticipates a phased reduction in IA demand in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should IA demand remain at current levels, or increase over time, we will be challenged to meet manning requirements for the Fleet. The Navy continues to size, shape, and stabilize our force through a series of performance-based measures designed to retain the skills, pay grades, and experience mix necessary to meet current and future requirements.

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10?

Admiral CLINGAN. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review focused on two objectives: to further rebalance the capabilities of the Armed Forces and institutionalize successful wartime innovations to better enable success in today's wars while ensuring our forces are prepared for a complex future; and to reform how the department does business. In conjunction with the completion of the QDR, the Deputy Secretary of Defense submitted the long-range plans for the construction of Naval vessels and the procurement of aircraft for the Navy and Air Force. These plans reflect the best effort of the Department of Defense to address the difficult planning challenge of forecasting requirements and procurement for a thirty year time frame. These products provide Congress a basic foundation for the assessment of the long-term readiness requirements of the force. Additional detail regarding the QDR is more appropriately addressed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion?

Admiral CLINGAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we've already paid for?

Admiral CLINGAN. The combined President's FY12 Budget request baseline and OCO budget submissions represent the best balance of risk and available resources across the Navy portfolio. The Navy appreciates the subcommittee's continuing support and believes both ship and aviation maintenance will be best served by supporting the President's FY12 Budget request. A comprehensive maintenance strategy is essential to minimizing the total ownership cost (TOC) of Navy platforms and to ensuring that these assets reach their expected service life. Crucial to executing any maintenance strategy is a clear understanding of the current condition of each asset and a detailed plan for properly maintaining and logistically supporting the equipment.

Submarines and aircraft carriers have well defined engineering processes that closely manage maintenance and repair work. Navy investments in the past several budget cycles in the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) and enhanced assessments of surface ships are providing Navy maintenance planners with greater insight on the maintenance and repair requirements and are facilitating refined ship life cycle management.

For aircraft, each Type/Model/Series of Naval aircraft have a rigorous sustainment construct that relies on a robust Fleet Support Team (FST) of engineers, logisticians, and other key aviation subject matter experts that utilize the concept of RCM (Reliability Centered Maintenance) to continuously monitor and improve the maintenance of in-service aircraft. The President's FY12 Budget request increased emphasis on continuing these key aviation FST functions.

Mr. FORBES. What do you feel is DoD's role in investing in alternative sources of energy? If so, which types of alternative energy (fuels, renewable energy, etc.), and do you believe the DoD is doing enough?

Admiral CLINGAN. The Department of the Navy (DON) has set two priorities that illustrate its role in investing in alternative sources of energy: Energy Security and Energy Independence. Energy Security is achieved by utilizing sustainable sources that meet tactical, expeditionary, and shore operational requirements and force sustainment functions, and, having the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Energy Independence is achieved when Naval forces rely only on energy resources that are not subject to intentional or accidental supply disruptions. As a priority, Energy Independence increases operational effectiveness by making Naval forces more energy self-sufficient and less dependent on vulnerable energy production and supply lines.

To demonstrate the feasibility of utilizing alternative sources of energy for tactical purposes, we have flown an F/A-18 Hornet on a 50/50 blend of JP-5/camelina fuel; operated a Riverine Command Boat (RCB-X) on a 50/50 blend of F-76/algae fuel; and test flown a Seahawk helicopter on a 50/50 blend of JP-5/camelina fuel. DON also commissioned the USS Makin Island that utilizes a gas turbine engine and electric auxiliary propulsion system, which leads to increased fuel efficiency. Like the other Services in DoD, DON leverages many different types of alternative energy solutions based upon various installations' geographic location, natural resources, and available technology that includes solar, wind, geothermal, and waste to energy applications. We have plans to install over 100 MW of solar power through the FYDP and are currently conducting 22 anemometer (wind) studies. In our Expeditionary Forward Operating Bases, we are using flexible solar panels to recharge batteries and light the insides of tents with energy efficient LED lighting. These are just a few examples of the different types of alternative energy sources that DON is currently using.

Lastly, the Secretary of the Navy has set forth five energy goals to reduce the Department of the Navy's overall consumption of energy, decrease its reliance on petroleum and significantly increase its use of alternative energy. DON is committed to thoughtfully investing in alternative sources of energy for the future.

The Secretary of the Navy's Energy Goals:

1. **Increase Alternative Energy Use DON-Wide:** By 2020, 50% of total DON energy consumption will come from alternative sources.
2. **Increase Alternative Energy Ashore:** By 2020, at least 50% of shore-based energy requirements will come from alternative sources; 50% of DON installations will be net-zero.
3. **Reduce Non-Tactical Petroleum Use:** By 2015, DON will reduce petroleum use in the commercial fleet by 50%.
4. **Sail the "Great Green Fleet":** DON will demonstrate a Green Strike Group in local operations by 2012 and sail it by 2016.
5. **Energy Efficient Acquisition:** Evaluation of energy factors will be mandatory when awarding contracts for systems and buildings.

Mr. FORBES. The costs of our weapons systems have risen dramatically in the last two decades. And in these current economic times, we can't afford to buy the quantities we need at these high procurement costs. This, in turn, reduces the economies of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military?

Admiral CLINGAN. To partially address the historic cost growth in weapons systems, the Navy has strengthened acquisition policy to improve program oversight, control requirements, and more effectively monitor contractor performance through acquisition program and portfolio reviews of acquisition programs and the supplier base. A Department of Navy instruction established acquisition governance comprised of a 2 pass, 6 Gate review that has achieved closer coordination between the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps. It also provided enterprise constructs to afford the opportunity to better understand and control costs, including operations and sustainment costs.

Navy has engaged in vigorous control of requirements growth and changes with the establishment of annual Configuration Steering Boards within the program review and oversight process. The Configuration Steering Board requires programs to provide business case analysis and tradeoff discussions to stringently control adjustments to requirements.

Process improvement initiatives are also being pursued in accountability, acquisition workforce management, and efficiencies as described in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics memo titled "Better Buying Power, Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending", dated 14 SEP 2010.

Complementary to these initiatives, Navy recommends stable funding for Programs throughout their development and economic quantity/multi-year procurements. These disciplined actions, which provide industry with steady workforce projections and encourage industry to invest in capital improvements, break the noted cycle and have a proven record of success.

Mr. FORBES. Are there other "out-of-the-box" ideas we should be considering in order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial time?

Admiral CLINGAN. From intense analysis of anti-access and area denial challenges to emerging energy technologies, new ideas are constantly being generated in order to ensure the Navy continues to perform its roles and missions in the evolving security and economic environments.

The Navy has a robust process for inspiring, developing and implementing new concepts and approaches in response to changing defense needs. The Navy's concept generation and concept development (CGCD) program provides a collaborative approach and structure for developing new strategic and operational concepts that address current and future challenges, position the service to seize opportunities, and serve to shape the Navy across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. The process includes vetting and validating new ideas through analytical studies, workshops, experimentation, Naval War College war games, and, as required, Fleet level live force experiments and exercises.

This process capitalizes on a strategic top-down approach, while enabling full and seamless integration with joint and coalition operations and requirements. The President's FY12 budget submission resources a variety of ideas across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) that have been vetted and are mature enough to merit investment.

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2010, Secretary Gates began an insourcing initiative to bring contracted functions back into the government. While the stated goal was to bring inherently governmental work back in house, we also were told that a 40% “savings” was being budgeted against the insourcing goals. As we look at the fiscal year 2012 budget request, we see many cases where the Secretary’s “efficiencies initiative” are driving reductions in civilian personnel authorizations and pay. Are there areas where functions that were identified for “insourcing” last year are now unfunded due to the “efficiencies initiative”? If so, how much risk is associated with these functions or positions being unfunded?

Admiral CLINGAN. In-sourcing is one of the tools the Navy uses to ensure the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor employees is available to accomplish its roles and missions. To meet FY12 budget expectations, in-sourcing priorities were re-evaluated, along with contractors overall, as part of a holistic workforce balancing effort.

Mr. FORBES. In the past year, the USMC successfully demonstrated its Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) which incorporates solar power technologies with a unit currently deployed to Afghanistan. That initiative had resounding success and buy-in from the individuals in the unit.

- Will the USMC continue the ExFOB?
- If so, will you incorporate new technologies and redeploy with future units?
- What is the FY12 PB request to fund these efforts?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. In your opinion, are we ready? Will we be ready for the types of threats described by the witnesses at last week’s hearing? If not, what should we be doing?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. While I understand that a rotational readiness model, such as the Army’s Force Generation Model, enables ready forces for Afghanistan and Iraq, it comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces. What are the strategic implications to the readiness of the force and our ability to respond to the types of threats the witnesses described in the hearing last week?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a “temporary fix” to the imbalance in the force. How has the long-term use of sailors and airmen to meet ground force requirements impacted the readiness of the Navy and Air Force? In your view, why has the DOD not been able to right-size its force structure to ensure that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task and not a surrogate from a different service with different core competencies?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. How is Congress to assess the long-term readiness requirements for the force when the QDR failed to provide the long-range, 20-year assessment required by Title 10?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. Timing and concurrency of events in the analysis must be examined by assuming more time between demand on the force, the requirements on the force are lowered (i.e., two near-simultaneous major combat operations across the globe require a different force structure than if the force planners assume the exact same events were to occur 30 days apart). In your view, are we ready to respond to multiple contingencies occurring in a near-simultaneous fashion?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. We are all very concerned with development and procurement costs of military ships, airplanes and vehicles. However, GAO has routinely stated that more than 75% of the total ownership costs of weapons systems are associated with the operation and sustainment of those assets. What can this subcommittee do to ensure that we can afford to operate and maintain the equipment we’ve already paid for?

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of scale and drives up the cost even further. What recommendations do you have for us to break this cycle so we can afford to provide modern, safe, effective equipment to our men and women in the military?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. Are there other "out-of-the-box" ideas we should be considering in order to respond to our national defense needs in this extremely risky financial time?

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General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. When Secretary of Defense Gates first accepted his post under the Bush Administration, he called for a 12-months boots on the ground policy to sustain dwell time goals. To date, home station mobilization and demobilization continues to be challenge for our men and women in the Guard and Reserves. I believe it improves readiness as well as morale and welfare when a soldier can deploy and demob from home station. Can you detail what efforts the Army has taken to achieve this policy objective of Secretary Gates? What can Congress do to help facilitate and expedite this matter?

General BOLGER. The Army utilizes a rotational force generation readiness model as a core process to achieve the SecDef 12-months boots on the ground policy and is actively engaged with making decisions in the Army's Campaign Plan for First Army's transformation initiative. This initiative will realign the deployment and demobilization stations. The Army recognizes that readiness and morale are key components of determining the locations of deployment and demobilization stations.

The Army continues its effort to reduce stress on the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces by achieving near term boots on the ground (BOG): Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 RC. Starting in FY12, Reserve Component Soldiers (USAR and ARNG) will have at least four years at home for every year deployed.

The Army's effort is contingent upon continued decrease in global demands and assured access to the Reserve Component. This effort will provide citizen Soldiers, Families and Employers with predictable deployment schedules. With your support for this plan, the Army will meet near-term BOG: Dwell goals of 1:2 AC and 1:4 RC starting in FY 12.

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years?

General BOLGER. The Army's FY12 President's Budget request funds the Service's highest priorities to support the current wars, ensure readiness and strategic depth in an uncertain and increasingly complex strategic environment, and care for Soldiers, their families and Army civilians. We will ensure that Army priorities are appropriately resourced using whatever means are appropriated by the Congress. However, as we look toward FY12 program execution, we ask for Congress' support in helping the Army mitigate any fact of life changes that may develop during the course of the year. The Army appreciates the continued commitment and support of the U.S. Congress in all that we do.

Please see attached April 15th, 2011, letter from GEN Dempsey to Representative Adam Smith. [See page 89.]

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the use of services contractors. In your role as your service's operations planner, how do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon services contractors?

General BOLGER. Logistics contractor requirements increased over time due to the extended duration of conflict, the nature of the conflict, and combatant commander operational decisions. The Army is reliant, but not over-reliant, on contractors for logistics and other base support services, as concluded by a 2010 Joint Staff study on contractor dependency in which the Army participated. The Army does not factor

in the role of contractors when calculating Readiness. However, contractors that provide maintenance operations (i.e., aircraft maintenance for Army aviation) do directly support the serviceability ratings of those organizations.

Ms. BORDALLO. Describe for me the Air Force's force sizing construct. Specifically, what type of force size metrics will be used in the future to capture accurately the inventory of aircraft available to the commanders? My understanding is, historically, the Air Force has counted structure via combat wings but is now moving to a tail-metric. I'm concerned that this will lead to an inflated perception about the readiness of our Air Force since a total count of wings won't be able to denote which aircraft are in depots or training. What is the rationale behind this change?

General CARLISLE. As the question has several parts, each will be addressed in turn.

Regarding force sizing inputs/direction: As threats to our national security have changed over time, so have our force sizing constructs. Accordingly, the force options that the AF provides to the President through the combatant commanders have changed from the one-size-fits-all fighter or combat wing to something more adaptable, scalable, and flexible to counter the evolving threat. To size a force that is able to respond to the pressing needs of combatant commanders today—yet remain adaptable to the ambiguous future threat—the AF participates actively in the Secretary of Defense's Support to Strategic Analysis (SSA).

Force sizing process: In the SSA framework there are scenarios in which demand for Service capabilities is measured after all the competing demands for forces are combined. Within the SSA, Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs) are built to represent a series of demands on forces. This is based on potential contingency operations in various theaters and in combination is sourced using only PMAI (Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory) "combat" and "combat support," coded aircraft inventory ensuring aircraft in depot and training units are properly accounted for. Within each of the ISCs there are three primary phases (non-surge, surge, and post-surge) in the planning construct. Component-specific (Active, ANG, AFR) rotation policies apply during the non- and post-surge phases that are included in force sizing to meet the demands.

Force Readiness: AF forces are counted and task-organized as wings, groups and squadrons which capture the total force numbers to include the number of aircraft platforms. The AF generates and presents its force to desired readiness levels, thereby eliminating tiered readiness and minimizing any strategic implications. For counting forces, the AF uses tail-metrics that include PMAI counts as well as total tails; for determining readiness, PMAI is used along with other factors. This will increase visibility into our fleets for sustainment and recapitalization purposes.

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years?

General CARLISLE. The Air Force made difficult choices while building the FY12 President's Budget, and we balanced our mission in a way that maximizes our efforts to support the joint fight, while embracing SECDEF guidance to achieve efficiencies goals. In accordance with Secretary Gates' intent, we looked within our own programs, strived to be more efficient, and used the savings for higher priorities, including readiness. We have identified several items that provide direct support to our combatant commanders in today's joint fight that emerged since the FY12 President's Budget submission. The A-10 Maintenance Tester and the EC-130H avionics upgrade improve our readiness posture and operational capabilities by resolving issues that could require grounding Aircraft. We also require a variety of munitions replacement in support of ongoing operations that will provide replenishment of weapons critical to meeting future wartime needs. If we receive full support of our FY12 budget request, we are confident we can fund our most critical requirements to ensure a ready force.

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the use of services contractors. In your role as your service's operations planner, how do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon services contractors?

General CARLISLE. Contractors play an important role from an operational perspective, and sometimes provide niche and interim maintenance support. Currently, contract maintenance comprises a small percentage of the total maintenance effort for 13 airframes. However, contract maintenance provides a high percentage in mission areas that expanded rapidly to meet warfighter needs or in situations where there are no trained Air Force personnel to maintain the aircraft. Five aircraft types (C-27J, MQ-1/9, MC-12W, and RC-26) fall into this category and rely solely on contract maintenance. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft category is scheduled to increase

to 800 aircraft by 2020 in order to meet warfighter demands. This rapid growth outpaced the Air Force's ability to staff and train personnel to maintain this high-demand capability, necessitating the use of contract maintenance. While readiness is not an issue with contractor maintained aircraft, the Air Force will transition the MQ-1/9 to organic support over time.

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR's like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR.

General CARLISLE. The Air Force provides Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to the combatant commands to support daily, steady-state operations and can redistribute assets when surge operations are required. The Joint Staff prioritizes and allocates ISR assets according to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan which matches available assets to combatant command requirements. While the majority of airborne ISR assets are currently supporting CENTCOM due to the high demand, assets are available to support efforts in the Pacific region. In addition to "national" assets that are available to meet COCOM requirements, the Air Force has established a Global Hawk squadron at Andersen AFB, Guam, and continues U-2 missions in the Republic of Korea. Additionally, Global Hawk, U-2 and WC-135 assets have all contributed to recent humanitarian operations in Japan.

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years?

Admiral CLINGAN. The Navy has two unfunded priorities for the PB12 budget submission. There is a \$367M shortfall in ship depot maintenance that equates to the deferral of 44 surface ship availabilities. Additionally, there is a \$317M shortfall in aviation spares which are used to support over 3,700 individual fleet aircraft.

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the use of services contractors. In your role as your service's operations planner, how do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon services contractors?

Admiral CLINGAN. As mandated by Congress, the Navy is responsible to man, train, and equip the force while the Combatant Commanders are responsible for operational planning and employment. The Combatant Commanders are in a better position to explain how service contractors are factored into operational planning.

The Navy employs a total force construct that applies the most suitable manpower—active, reserve, civilian, contractor—to accomplish specific tasks. The balance is adjusted annually as we shape the force to meet the needs of the Navy and address policy and fiscal guidance.

The total force remains well postured to prevail in current conflicts and respond effectively to the multiple, concurrent, diverse crises anticipated in the future.

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand that all the services continue to improve and increase their ISR capabilities across the various Combatant Commands. I am concerned that there is an over-focus of those assets in the CENTCOM AOR to the detriment of other AOR's like the Pacific. Can both of you describe what their respective service is doing to close this gap which poses significant risk, in my estimation, to our forces in the Pacific? I think we can all agree, as our independent panel testified last week, that it is paramount to our national security to continue to have unimpeded access to the Pacific theater and to have better intelligence in this AOR.

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Ms. BORDALLO. What are each of the services top 3 unfunded requirements associated with ensuring a ready force, both in the near-term and in the out-years?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department of Defense has become overly dependent on the use of services contractors. In your role as your service's operations planner, how do you factor in the use and role of services contractor? How do you measure how much your readiness to respond to continuing and emerging threats is reliant upon services contractors?

General TRYON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN

Mr. RUNYAN. Ensuring that our deploying and deployed forces have the equipment, training, and personnel they need often comes at the expense of non-deployed Army units. Under current budget constraints, what are the strategic implications for Reserve and National Guard Army units and their ability to provide "surge" capability to meet current and future threats?

General BOLGER. Manning: The Army Reserve/National Guard (ARNG) has been very successful in maintaining its assigned End Strength. However, the ARNG does not have the ability to pull from a pool of Soldiers at schools or in the accession pipeline as the Active Component does. All ARNG Soldiers are assigned to a Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) position. This creates a situation where the ARNG must cross level between units and sometimes states in order to ensure that all ARNG formations are deploying at 100%. The ARNG has successfully met all requirements to date in support of overseas contingency operations. If recruiting and individual training resources do not meet requirements, the ARNG will be in a degraded position to continue to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) demands.

Equipping: The ARNG is at the highest level of equipment modernization and readiness that it has ever been. If that level of readiness is not sustained with the required resource levels then the ARNG's future ability to surge in support of overseas contingencies as well as Homeland Defense/Security will be degraded.

Training: Pre-mobilization training resources set the stage for successful post-mobilization training and validation for deployment. The ARNG in conjunction with United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and First Army has worked to decrease the amount of post-mobilization training time over the last 10 years. This decreased post-mobilization training time enables increased "Boots on the Ground" (BOG) time in theater. If pre-mobilization training resources are decreased, there will be a direct impact to the amount of BOG that Reserve Component (RC) units will perform.

Overall decreased funding for the ARNG will create a situation whereby supporting surge efforts will be significantly degraded. The timelines involved with building readiness for RC units mandate that funding be at or near required levels. It is too late to apply increased funding when a surge demand is received. The timelines for acquiring and fielding equipment, sending Soldiers to Schools, and conducting individual pre-mobilization training are too long to support immediate reaction to OCO demand. If the RC is funded at required levels, units can respond to immediate demands as evidenced most recently by the 60-90 day notification to mobilization experienced by the 77TH Theater Aviation Brigade, the 116TH Infantry Brigade Headquarters, and six ARNG Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (TUAS) Platoons.

Mr. RUNYAN. We have not had a very good track record of predicting the next contingency. What is the Army doing to be ready for that next contingency and where do you think it will occur?

General BOLGER. While we cannot predict with certainty when and where crises may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent conflict Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of missions. In order to best respond to a full spectrum of future operations the Army is creating a Surge Force. This Surge Force is capable of resourcing all Army requirements for the first two phases of the Department of Defense's operational contingency plans, one additional small scale contingency, and a homeland security event. The Surge Force will consist of one corps headquarters, three division headquarters, ten brigade combat teams, and 41,000 enablers in support of these formations. The Army's rotational model resources these units to high readiness levels before they enter the Surge Force window. Surge Force units will have sufficient dwell time to train to full spectrum standards.

Mr. RUNYAN. We have been in combat now for almost ten years with many soldiers having repeated deployments. What effect has this had on unit, soldier and family readiness? How will your rotational model assist in preserving the all volunteer force and provide for a more ready force?

General BOLGER. Multiple deployments have rendered our Army out of balance. The effects of repeated deployments are increases in behavioral health stress in Soldiers, the number of non-deployable Soldiers in units, and high risk behaviors that affect the Soldier and their Families. Additional effects are a deployment to dwell ratio below 1:2 Active Component (AC) and 1:4 Reserve Component (RC), backlogs in Professional Military Education, and the lack of strategic depth and flexibility to support unforeseen contingencies. Restoring balance to the Army is a high priority. Full implementation of the Army supply based force generation model establishes predictable BOG:Dwell ratios, prepares the Army for full spectrum operations and

sustains the All-Volunteer Force. The Army fully supports programs that sustain and build resilient Soldiers, Families, and Civilians. The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and Army Risk Reduction and Health Promotion Program will assist in improving behavioral health. We will also maintain our pledge to the Army Family Covenant by assisting our Families in meeting the challenges, stresses and strains on those left behind.

Mr. RUNYAN. What are the Army's three main challenges in readiness today?

General BOLGER. 1. Demand. The number one challenge to readiness today remains the continued and excessive demand for Army forces. While the overall demand for Army forces has been reduced, the demand for critical enablers continues to exceed sustainable levels, further challenging the Army's ability to meet required dwell time ratios for those units. Unique, ad hoc, and individual manning demands (joint manning documents, individual augmentations, etc.) place additional burdens on the force.

2. Balance. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model provides a path for Army units to build readiness over time in order to maximize mission or contingency related readiness prior to arrival date or availability windows. However, because of the continued and excessive demand, the Army remains out of balance, both across the ARFORGEN Force Pools (Reset, Train/Ready and Available) and across the Components (Active and Reserve). Additionally, critical resources are often shifted from our non-deployed forces to ensure the success of our deployed forces. This is especially problematic for those units in the Train/Ready window, which under the doctrinal design of ARFORGEN, are to be manned and equipped to respond to un-foreseen contingencies. Currently, the Army's ability to respond to those contingencies is challenged and is addressed in the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA).

3. Material Availability. The Reset phase of ARFORGEN is critical to ensuring that equipment is refitted, re-distributed, and/or fielded as new equipment to units. The Army forecasts the need for Reset may continue for multiple years following the end of Operation New Dawn (CY 2011) and Operation Enduring Freedom. Steady, predictable, and continued support for both procurement and modernization of equipment coupled with continued support for the Army's Reset program is imperative to ensuring the adequate availability of equipment.

Mr. RUNYAN. General Carlisle, in the near term what are your top Unfunded Requirements (URs) for Air Force readiness?

General CARLISLE. The Air Force made difficult choices while building the FY12 President's Budget, and we balanced our mission in a way that maximizes our efforts to support the joint fight, while embracing SECDEF guidance to achieve efficiencies goals. In accordance with Secretary Gates' intent, we looked within our own programs, strived to be more efficient, and used the savings for higher priorities, to include readiness. We have identified several items that provide direct support to our Combatant Commanders in today's joint fight that emerged since the FY12 President's Budget submission. The A-10 Maintenance Tester and the EC-130H avionics upgrade improve our readiness posture and operational capabilities by resolving issues that could require grounding Aircraft. We also require a variety of munitions replacement in support of ongoing operations that will provide replenishment of weapons critical to meeting future wartime needs. If we receive full support of our FY12 budget request, we are confident we can fund our most critical requirements to ensure a ready force.

Mr. RUNYAN. The fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects shortfalls in depot maintenance requirements. With an aging aircraft fleet how much risk does this pose to Air Force Readiness. What is the impact?

General CARLISLE. Although we took risk in weapon system support by initially funding it at 80 percent, we identified efficiencies that improved funding to 85 percent. Additionally, we are managing near term risk and maintaining our warfighting readiness through balanced support to our legacy fleet and new aircraft. The 16 percent in unfunded requirement risk includes software, sustaining engineering and technical orders; however, this is mitigated through enterprise-wide prioritization to fund the highest priority systems in the year of execution while ensuring a stable depot workload and workforce is maintained. The long-term depot maintenance risk is mitigated through Full Scale Fatigue Testing and Structural Integrity and Service Life Extension Programs which will improve the sustainability of legacy aircraft and ensure total force readiness.